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Dissertation Abstract

We take ourselves to have some knowledge about what’s right and wrong to do. But how easy
is this knowledge to get? In the first two chapters of this dissertation I argue for the novel conclusion
that it is harder to have moral knowledge than non-moral knowledge due to the fact that moral beliefs
have more practically at stake. More specifically, in chapter 1 I argue that moral beliefs are subject to a
higher epistemic standard than non-moral beliefs. Roughly, epistemic standards mark how good of an
epistemic position an agent needs to be in in order for her beliefs to receive epistemic credit like
knowledge. The higher epistemic standard of moral beliefs offers the only unified explanation to date
of long-standing puzzling asymmetries between moral and non-moral epistemology, like how moral
testimony, unlike non-moral testimony, is problematic and moral expertise, unlike non-moral
expertise, is non-existent.
Even so, one may wonder why moral beliefs have such a higher epistemic standard. In chapter
2 I argue that the best account of what fixes the higher epistemic standard for moral beliefs is a
practical-stakes account wherein the practical upshots of holding a belief affect how demanding the
standard is. Importantly, my account differs from traditional practical-stakes accounts of epistemic
standards. First, it locates features of morality as a subject matter, like being subject to the reactive
attitudes and the way that moral beliefs typically motivate whereas non-moral beliefs don’t, as that
which functions to raise the standard. Second, the stakes that are relevant outrun those stemming
from the interests of the individual person whose belief is under assessment, and include the practical
interests of other agents. This last feature makes the picture of moral knowledge I offer essentially
social, as whether or not one has moral knowledge depends in part on the interests of others. In the

end, the view I offer in these chapters presents a perhaps surprising picture of moral epistemology as
systematically different from non-moral epistemology.
In chapter 3 I investigate in more detail the social basis of moral knowledge by considering one
particular view of the nature of moral facts, constructivism. According to this view, moral facts are
determined by what would be the result of a hypothetical choice procedure amongst an idealized
group of agents. Here I argue that the best moral epistemology on offer for the constructivist requires
an agent to be able to respond to the objections that relevant others would have to the content of one’s
belief in order for that belief to count as knowledge. In this way, moral knowledge for constructivists
requires the ability to reason together with others about morality.
After considering social constraints on moral knowledge, in chapter 4 I turn to consider
whether normativity may likewise have a social basis. Here, I consider social-based views of
normativity wherein an agent’s reasons for action are determined by the social institutions, practices,
and relations (IPRs) she takes part in. I argue that existing views have trouble ensuring that certain
intuitively bad social practices--namely, oppressive ones--aren’t a source of reasons. In light of this, I
develop a novel positive view, Looping Social Constructivism, according to which an agent’s reasons
are a function of the IPRs she takes part in, after they are idealized. Specifically, they are idealized such
that each role in the IPR has the same ability to determine how rights, responsibilities, and power are
distributed across the IPR. Looping Social Constructivism is able to avoid issues of oppressive IPRs
given its unique use of idealization on the social level: instead of idealizing the individual agents taking
part in an IPR, we idealize structural features of the IPR itself.
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Chapter 1
“Harder, Better, Faster, Stronger: Epistemic Standards and Moral Beliefs”

0. Introduction
Moral epistemology might seem useless. Not because there is nothing valuable to be learned
by investigating the epistemology of moral beliefs, but rather because all that we can hope to learn
about the epistemology of moral beliefs can be learnt by doing standard non-moral epistemology.
Pessimistically, one might think, there is nothing special about moral beliefs, and they deserve no
further attention than that properly paid to their non-moral analogues. The real epistemic battles to
be fought are those in classic debates in traditional epistemology: whether internalism or
externalism about justification is true, whether knowledge requires safety or sensitivity, whether
the threat of skepticism destroys the possibility of knowledge, and so on.
Yet when we look to certain areas within moral epistemology, this is the minority view.
Rather, many have thought that moral beliefs are epistemically special in some ways, and that there
are noteworthy asymmetries between certain areas in our moral and non-moral epistemology.
These differences are often viewed as obstacles or hurdles moral beliefs face on their way to moral
knowledge that non-moral beliefs don’t face. For example, while non-moral knowledge is thought
to be easily achieved via testimony, non-moral testimony is thought to be epistemically problematic,
morally problematic, or both.1
While some seek to undermine or debunk this claim, this is the starting judgment or “datum” concerning moral
testimony that authors both for and against it address. See Crisp (2014); Hills (2009); Hopkins (2007); Howell (2014);
McGrath (2009); Mogensen (2015); and Nickel (2001) for explicit arguments in favor of the asymmetrically problematic
nature of moral testimony.
1
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In this paper, I, too, will argue that moral beliefs are epistemically special and hence require
a special epistemology. However, instead of focusing on isolated issues in moral epistemology such
as testimony, my investigation will concern broader differences between moral and non-moral
epistemology. I’ll seek to give a unifying explanation of the differences others have sought to explain
in isolation. The way in which moral beliefs are distinct, I will argue, is that their epistemic standard
is typically higher. Generally speaking, this means that one typically needs to be in a better epistemic
position for one’s moral belief to receive the relevant kind of epistemic credit (for example,
justification or knowledge) than that needed for one’s non-moral belief to receive the same kind of
epistemic credit (justification, knowledge). For instance, on an evidentialist model this amounts to
saying that one generally needs stronger evidence to have a justified moral belief than to have a
justified non-moral belief.
To be clear, I am not arguing for a universal claim: that for every single moral belief it will
have a higher epistemic standard compared to that for any other non-moral belief. Such a universal
claim is too strong to be plausible. Rather, my claim is that this is typically the case, and as such it is a
characteristic and noteworthy feature of moral epistemology as such. Importantly, one need not
endorse such a universal claim to adequately explain the asymmetries between particular areas of
moral and non-moral epistemology, since, as will be covered in section 1, these concern general
issues with particular aspects of moral epistemology. For example, the noted asymmetry is not that
for every single possible instance of testimony, any instance of moral testimony will be more
problematic than any instance of non-moral testimony, for that would be quite implausible; rather,
it is that moral testimony in general is (more) problematic.2
The same can be said for the other aspects of moral epistemology that have received widespread attention, namely
expertise, and the effect disagreement has in undermining knowledge or leading to skepticism. Expertise by definition
concerns a general ability, or knowledge of a range of facts about a particular topic, not perfect ability or knowledge of
2
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The paper will proceed by first considering three areas that many people have found
puzzling for moral beliefs as opposed to non-moral beliefs: testimony, expertise, and disagreement.
Although others have attempted solutions to these puzzles, they have done so in an isolated way,
seeking to solve the puzzles individually rather than collectively. In this paper, I will put forth the
only unified solution to these issues currently on offer. After providing my unifying account--an
account I call the Higher Standards account--and showing how it explains moral testimony, moral
expertise, and moral disagreement, I consider two competing unifying accounts and argue that both
are unacceptable. Finally, I consider and respond to two objections to my own account.

1. The Oddity of Moral Epistemology
One area of moral epistemology that has recently received a great deal of attention is moral
testimony. One reason this topic has garnered so much attention is the noteworthy asymmetry in
our judgments regarding instances of moral and non-moral testimony: while we think it’s perfectly
acceptable to form non-moral beliefs solely on the basis of others’ reports, we balk at instances of
forming moral beliefs solely on another person’s say-so.3 For example, consider the following
instances of moral testimony:
Eleanor has always enjoyed eating meat but has recently realized that it raises some
moral issues. Rather than thinking further about these, however, she talks to a
friend, who tells her that eating meat is wrong. Eleanor knows that her friend is
normally trustworthy and reliable, so she believes her and accepts that eating meat is
wrong.4
every single fact about a particular topic. Likewise, the phenomenon regarding moral disagreement concerns how it in
general leads to skepticism, not how every single instance of moral disagreement undermines the status of knowledge
for every single moral belief every single person has. I further explain how my account of there typically being a higher
epistemic standard for moral beliefs explains puzzling asymmetries in moral epistemology in section 2.2.
3
For defenses of this asymmetry see Crisp (2014); Hills (2009); Hopkins (2007); Howell (2014); McGrath (2009);
Mogensen (2015); and Nickel (2001).
4
Hills (2009), p. 94.

3

Danielle hears about an upcoming demonstration protesting Israel's war in Gaza.
Although she knows the causes of the war and knows that civilians are dying from
IDF bombing, Danielle is unsure whether the war is just. She doesn’t try to think
through the matter for herself. Instead, she asks a reliable and trustworthy friend,
who says the war is immoral. Danielle accepts her friend's claim and joins the
protest. Asked by a journalist why she is demonstrating, Danielle says she knows the
war is wrong because her friend told her so.5
Here, many object to Eleanor’s and Danielle’s reliance on their friends in forming their moral
beliefs: there is something prima facie wrong about Eleanor and Danielle forming their moral
beliefs just on the basis of their friends’ say-so. Importantly, these judgments don’t seem to be
confined to the specific moral subject matter (e.g. eating meat) or sporadic; as Sarah McGrath notes,
“the attitude that pure moral deference is more problematic than non-moral deference is
widespread, even if not universal, in our culture.”6
Moral testimony isn’t the only area in moral epistemology that presents unique epistemic
challenges. Expertise is another area where there seem to be deep differences between the moral
and non-moral epistemic domains. While it’s undoubtedly the case that there are experts on all
kinds of non-moral subjects, moral experts are thought to be at best few and far between, and at
worst entirely non-existent.7 Moreover, while it’s usually clear what’s required for expertise in
various non-moral subjects, there’s quite general confusion and disagreement over what would
even be required for moral expertise. To put it most pessimistically: if, contrary to appearances,
there even were any moral experts, we would be seriously hard pressed to find them.8
And, if moral testimony and expertise weren’t enough, moral disagreement poses its own
unique challenges. Unlike disagreement in non-moral domains, moral disagreement is thought to

Mogensen (2015), p.1.
McGrath (2009), p. 323.
7
McGrath (2011) and (2007); Ryle (1958).
8
Cholbi (2007).
5
6
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be especially intractable, as it persists even when both parties appear to share the same (non-moral)
evidence. Likewise, moral disagreement seems to be a much more widespread phenomenon than
non-moral disagreement. Because of its intractability and persistence, the mere fact of moral
disagreement is sometimes thought to lead directly to moral skepticism.9 Note that no such route to
non-moral skepticism (about the existence of global warming, say) is generally thought to be
available.
This way in which moral disagreement is thought to lead to moral skepticism will be my
focus here regarding the epistemic asymmetry of moral and non-moral disagreement. Of course,
there two closely related issues regarding moral disagreement about which I say nothing here. They
concern (a) why moral disagreement is so widespread and intractable, and (b) whether we should be
steadfast and retain our moral beliefs when faced with such disagreement. I choose to set these
related issues aside and focus on the question of how moral disagreement can lead to moral
skepticism for present purposes because unlike the issue of skepticism, (a) and (b) do not directly
concern notable epistemic asymmetries in moral epistemology. I take (a) to be a metaphysical
metaethical concern, as the widespread and persistent nature of moral disagreement typically takes
metaphysical explanations, like that moral relativism or expressivism is true.10 Although (b) is an
epistemic issue, I take it to be a question on the topic of peer disagreement in general, and not a
noted asymmetry in moral epistemology in particular (that is, it is not widely thought that the
correct response to peer disagreement about morality (e.g. steadfastness) differs from what is widely

For example, Tolhurst (1987) argues that it makes our moral beliefs never justified, while McGrath (2009) and Vavova
(2014) both argue that disagreement leads to skepticism about a certain subset of our moral beliefs.
10
For views that take the widespread and persistent nature of moral disagreement as support for moral relativism see
Harman (1996), Prinz (2007), and Wong (2006).
9
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thought as the correct response to peer disagreement about non-moral matters (e.g.
conciliationism)).
While moral epistemologists have offered explanations of these issues, what is striking is
that all of the approaches have been piecemeal in nature: such accounts aim to explain why moral
testimony is especially problematic, or why moral expertise is especially difficult, or why moral
disagreement is especially bad for moral knowledge. For example, proposals to explain moral
testimony appeal to problems it creates for moral agency, or moral understanding (the true “aim” of
moral beliefs), or that we can’t reliably identify reliable testifiers.11 Likewise, explanations of the
puzzle of moral expertise have pointed to difficulties in identifying them or to the widespread
presence of disagreement as undermining the possibility of moral experts.12 Lastly, accounts of
moral disagreement have proposed that the explanation of why moral disagreement leads to
skepticism lies in the acceptance of an epistemic position on disagreement in general,
Conciliationism.13 But when each of the issues of moral testimony, moral expertise, and moral
disagreement are taken together as a whole, the phenomenon to be explained changes its tone and
becomes quite striking: it seems that there’s not some special problem with moral testimony or
expertise or disagreement, but, rather, some special problem with moral epistemology as a whole.
Of course, there have been those who hold that our judgments concerning the oddity of
moral testimony, expertise, and disagreement are illusory, preferring instead to offer debunking
explanations of these judgements and arguing that there is nothing distinctly problematic about

For accounts which point to issues with moral agency, see Crisp (2014); Hills (2009); Hopkins (2007); Howell (2014);
Mogensen (2015); and Nickel (2001). See Hills (2009) for the claim that moral testimony excludes moral understanding.
See McGrath (2009) for the claim that there are issues with identifying reliable testifiers in the moral domain.
12
For issues with identification, see Cholbi (2007); and Driver (2006). For the claim that there are no experts, see Cross
(2016). Perhaps the oldest argument against moral experts is given by Ryle (1958), but, unlike more contemporary
work, it assumes non-cognitivism.
13
Vavova (2014). See Christensen (2007) for an argument for and articulation of Conciliationism.
11
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them.14 My purposes in this paper is not to take issue with the asymmetry claim itself. Rather,
what’s notable is that all approaches to these puzzles and apparent asymmetries between moral and
non-moral beliefs have been disuni ied. Supposing that there are these puzzling differences, my aim
in this paper is to give a unifying account that can explain these apparent puzzles with moral
testimony, moral expertise, and moral disagreement.
In the next section, I will provide such a unifying account. My unifying model appeals to a
single mechanism: epistemic standards and how they shift. This means, roughly, that the standard
agents must meet in order to receive the relevant positive epistemic credit (e.g., knowledge or
justification) is typically more stringent for moral beliefs than the corresponding standard is for
non-moral beliefs. In order to assess this account, we should first turn to the concept of an
epistemic standard.

2. The Higher Standards Account
2.1. Epistemic Standards
In very basic terms, we can think of an epistemic standard as marking how good of an
epistemic position an agent needs to be in to count as knowing or as having a justified belief. The
notion of an epistemic standard captures the intuitive idea that in order to determine whether an
agent’s belief is justified or counts as knowledge, we need to know not just how much evidence she
has, but how much she needs. This concept of an epistemic standard allows us to capture the thought
that for some areas of inquiry or in some contexts, what’s required for knowledge or justification

For arguments against the asymmetry of moral testimony, see Groll and Decker (2014); Jones (1999); Reisner and
Van Weelden (2015); and Sliwa (2012). For defenses of moral expertise, see Driver (2013); Jones and Schroeter (2012);
and Singer (1972). Against the significance of moral disagreement, see Decker and Groll (2013).
14
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changes: it’s not that knowledge of every kind of fact requires the exact same strength of evidence.
This is just to say that sometimes, we think the epistemic standard shifts.15
This shiftiness of epistemic standards has been utilized by contextualists in epistemology to
explain the fluctuation of our knowledge attributions. For it seems that, while we may want to deny
large-scale skepticism wherein agents always know little to nothing at all, we may also want to
endorse small-scale skepticism, wherein agents fail to know particular things in particularly
demanding circumstances. For example, while it seems perfectly innocuous to say that I know that I
have hands when I am walking to class, once I find myself embedded in a classroom discussion
about skepticism it seems right to deny that I know I have hands. Contextualists will explain these
shifty judgments by appealing to epistemic standards: from the walk to the classroom to the
discussion of skepticism within the classroom the epistemic standard has changed (more specifically
it has gotten more strict).16 In this case, while my perception of my appearing to have hands was
good enough to make my belief that I have hands knowledge outside of the classroom, it is no
longer sufficient to get me knowledge once inside the classroom’s skeptical walls.
That is the intuitive idea. But we can give an even more fine-grained account of epistemic
standards than this. Looking closer at the way contextualists utilize talk of standards, we can say
that an epistemic standard specifies a range of epistemic possibilities that an agent may ignore or fail
to rule out while still counting as knowing or having a justified belief.17 These possibilities would

I use an evidentialist model of standards here for the sake of simplicity. Nothing in my argument hangs on this
assumption.
16
See Cohen (1986).
17
Strictly speaking, this is actually where contextualists and fallibilists--who also appeal to epistemic standards--part
ways in their understanding of what a standard specifies. Fallibilists will say that an agent does not need to rule out
every possibility, while contextualists will say that they do; the difference is how each is quantifying over ‘every’. For the
fallibilist, ‘every’ really does pick out every single possibility, while for the contextualist ‘every’ picks out a certain subset
of every single possibility, for example every salient possibility. This is perhaps why some contextualists hold that
contextualism is an infallibilist position (see Lewis (1996)), while others hold it to be fallibilist in nature (see Heller
15
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specify ways the world could be in which not-p is true (when one’s belief is p). Importantly, this
means that for any given belief, there is more than one epistemic possibility: we are not to divide up
the epistemic possible worlds simply into two worlds, p and not-p, where one of these is the actual
world. Rather, epistemic possibilities are individuated by ways in which your belief could be false.
For example, there are many possible worlds in which your belief that you have hands is false: you
could be hallucinating, you could be dreaming, etc.. But only some of the ways the world could
be--only some of these possible worlds--are relevant to the epistemic status of your beliefs in the
actual world because of some relation they bear to you, and that you bear to them: they are salient,
or relevant, etc. Provided you are able to rule out that set of worlds where your belief would be
false, you receive the relevant positive epistemic status for your belief (e.g. knowledge, justification).
Overall, the rigor of an epistemic standard can be specified in one of two ways: sometimes, a more
rigorous standard specifies more possibilities that one must be able to rule out, while other times it
specifies possibilities that are simply harder to rule out. My account allows for both of these
interpretations of rigor.
Like rigor, the notion of “ruling out” possibilities can be understood in a number of ways.
On a probabilistic model, this could mean either that one makes some possibilities more improbable,
or that one makes more possibilities improbable. My claim is just that for moral beliefs, the epistemic
standard shifts, becoming more rigorous and thus requiring more in one of these two ways.
Importantly, this view of standards is also compatible with both internalist and externalist theories
of justification and knowledge. For example, if one were a reliabilist, the upwards shift in the rigor
of the standard would require one to have more safety or sensitivity. If one were an evidentialist,

(1999)). In the end, though, each camp seems to agree on this general statement: out of all the total possibilities, in order
to know an agent must be able to rule out only all of those possibilities in a subset of these total possibilities.
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one would be required to possess stronger evidence that rules out more possibilities. What’s
important for my claim is that what it takes to have an epistemic state (justification, knowledge)
depends on the rigor of the standard, and that morality makes this rigor increase.
Additionally, my account is neutral along specific competing accounts of how standards are
fixed, which determine the range of the worlds one is required to rule out.18 For example, some
hold that this range is flexible, picking out different worlds in different contexts (contextualists,
subject sensitive invariantists), while others hold that the same range of worlds is picked out in all
contexts (invariantists). Fully addressing what can cause the shiftiness of the standard in general,
and the shiftiness of standards for moral beliefs in particular, is unfortunately a question outside the
scope of the current paper. However, to preserve the credibility of my claim that moral beliefs
typically have a higher standard it is important that there at least be some prima facie plausible
models available, so I will briefly address this issue here.
One possible model of how standards are fixed is the well-known stakes-model, wherein an
epistemic standard is determined by the practical stakes, or costs of one’s belief turning out to be
false.19 I defend such a standards-fixing model elsewhere. I argue that there are certain practical
stakes that are unique to moral beliefs (for example, the costs of being the target of certain reactive
attitudes) such that when we account for these stakes, such a model does a good job of tracking how
most moral beliefs have a higher epistemic standard and how the ones that intuitively don’t, don’t.
Although further details of this model are too complicated to adequately address here, I hope that it
seems initially plausible. Of course, if this particular model does not sound appealing, one need not

To be clear: my account of what an epistemic standard is is neutral along these lines; however, invariantism regarding
epistemic standards (that is, standards for any and all kinds of beliefs) is incompatible with my argument for the higher
standard for moral beliefs.
19
See Stanley (2005) and Fantl and McGrath (2009) for accounts which have the standard sensitive to the subject’s
interests, and McKenna (2011) for an account which has the standard sensitive to the assessor’s interests.
18
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reject my claim that moral beliefs typically have a higher standard. The claim that moral beliefs have
a higher epistemic standard does not depend on the success of this particular standards-fixing
model, for one could always adopt a different standards-fixing model. For example, one could
instead adopt a kind of Relevant Alternatives Contextualist view, where the possibilities that one
must be able to rule out are those that are presupposed or otherwise entered into the conversational
score, coupled with a view that moral beliefs presuppose more or more difficult to rule out
possibilities.20 Again, although I lack the space here to adequately address which standards-fixing
models are most plausible as accounts of the typical higher standard for moral beliefs, such plausible
models are available, and so the credibility of the claim I make here that moral beliefs have such a
higher standard should remain intact.
2.2. A Unifying Explanation
With this conception of both epistemic standards and the idea that the epistemic standard
for justification is typically stricter for moral than for non-moral beliefs in hand, we can approach
our original problem. I’ll now briefly explain how my Higher Standards account resolves the three
puzzling featured in moral epistemology with which we began.
First, consider moral testimony and the default judgment that it is an illegitimate way to
gain moral knowledge. According to my account, in order to have moral knowledge the
requirement for an agent to rule out possible worlds in pretty stringent: an agent either needs to
rule out a significant number of possible worlds or a set of worlds that are harder to rule out. The
reason why agents are unable to gain moral knowledge from testimony is because merely forming
one’s belief on the basis of another’s report does not provide one with the ability to rule out all of

20

See, for example, Blome-Tillman (2009) for such a view regarding non-moral epistemic standards.
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the possibilities that one would need to in order to have knowledge. Although testimony may equip
one with true moral beliefs, it does not equip one with the ability to rule out the demanding set of
possible worlds that one needs to in order to have moral knowledge.21
Next, consider the apparent lack of moral expertise. According to my account, the standard
for moral expertise is stricter than the standard for expertise in other, non-moral domains. This
means that the kind of epistemic credentials one would need to have in order to count as an expert
are greater for moral expertise. For example, one would need to be able to rule out a comparatively
large amount of possibilities for a comparatively large amount of moral beliefs to count as an expert.
The reason why moral experts are few or entirely non-existent is because few or perhaps none of us
have the ability to do this.
Lastly, my model can explain how disagreement may, after all, lead to skepticism. One way
it could do this is by functioning to make relevant new possibilities. For example, it may function to
make relevant possibilities like my making a mistake in reasoning, or succumbing to a bias. The
more widespread the disagreement, the more possibilities require ruling out in order to qualify as
having knowledge. Provided that I cannot rule these out, I fail to secure knowledge. Since standards
are understood in terms of possibilities that must be ruled out, moral disagreement leads to

One may wonder how far my Higher Standards account goes in explaining not just asymmetries in judgments about
cases of pure moral and non-moral deference (where speakers do not inform hearers of any of the reasons for the truth
of their belief) but also in explaining asymmetries in judgments about cases of impure moral and non-moral deference
(where hearers come to adopt not only the speaker’s belief, but also their reasons in support of the truth of their belief).
The worry is that since my account explains the asymmetry in terms of being in a position to rule out possibilities, in
cases of impure moral deference the hearer would be able to rule out all of the same possibilities as the speaker, since
they possess the same reasons for the belief; but, the asymmetry remains even in these cases, as we still judge that the
hearer lacks justification or knowledge while the speaker does not. However, my Higher Standards view is amenable to
preserving this asymmetry of impure testimony: it can do so by adopting a more robust interpretation of what “ruling
out” requires. For example, on some contextualist views, ruling out would require more than just possessing evidence
that makes certain propositions improbable to a certain degree. Rather, it requires that one is able to engage with others
in a certain way, for example by appeasing any objections they may have about the truth of your belief. For this more
robust understanding of “ruling out”, see Annis (1978) and Wellman (1971) on the Challenge-Response Model. I’m
grateful to Kieran Setiya for posing this question about the flexibility of my view.
21
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skepticism by making more possibilities relevant, and thus by making the epistemic standard more
stringent.
Now that we’re clear on how my Higher Standards account explains these problematic
asymmetries, we should look to see how alternative unified accounts would explain the
asymmetries. Since in this paper I am seeking an explanation of the apparent oddity of moral
epistemology that would vindicate our commonsense judgments about moral testimony, moral
expertise, and moral disagreement, I will not be considering debunking explanations of that oddity.
As alternative explanations, the accounts to consider are those that posit a mechanism other than
the one I appeal to, namely epistemic standards. In the next section, I will consider such rival
accounts.

3. Alternative Explanations
3.1. Morality is Hard
One explanation that moral epistemology in general is more problematic than non-moral
epistemology is that moral matters are just so exceedingly difficult to figure out. It’s just so much
more difficult, the thought goes, to determine moral matters such as whether abortion or eating
meat is morally permissible than whether the bus runs on Saturdays. It’s a very difficult task to do
the work that is necessary to adequately settle moral questions: one must consider arguments for
and against, checking for falsities, fallacies, counterexamples, and more. Both the kind of reasoning
and time required to consider such questions is large and looming. Morality is hard.
Of course, I agree that morality is hard: this is something that my Higher Standards account
explains. In order for this view to be a real competitor, it can’t simply amount to the view that
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moral matters are difficult, since the Higher Standards account may admit this, and then just explain
this fact in terms of a more rigorous epistemic standard for morality. Instead, this account must
explain what makes moral matters epistemically difficult, but must do so by appeal to a mechanism
other than the one I’ve identified in order to be a genuine rival.
There are two mechanisms that this rival account might point to. One way of thinking
about the “morality is hard” view is that settling moral questions requires a large amount of time;
alternatively, one may think that the kind of reasoning required to settle moral questions is
exceedingly demanding. Using E to stand for the evidence base that’s required to have a justified
belief, the view might be either (a) that it is harder to obtain E, i.e. one generally needs to spend
more time working in order to obtain E, or (b) that it is harder to draw a or the correct conclusion
on the basis of E, i.e. that the kind of reasoning required to work through one’s evidence in order to
arrive at a justified belief is of a high level or is quite complex (e.g. it involves the use of difficult
mathematical formulas), or both (a) and (b).
Let’s take option (a) first. Given this mechanism, one would say that the reason why moral
knowledge or justification is harder to obtain is that one needs more time working through or
thinking about moral issues in order to successfully arrive at knowledge. More specifically, many
agents considering moral questions just haven’t obtained E yet (or, more minimally, that they’ve
been able to obtain less of E than the amount of E they’re typically able to obtain within the same
time for the E that corresponds to various non-moral beliefs).22 Taking option (b) instead, one
would say that the reason why moral knowledge or justification is harder to obtain is that moral
issues require one to engage in more demanding or complex forms of reasoning in order to
For example, one could think that one needs normative evidence to justify a normative belief, and it is generally
harder to acquire normative evidence (than descriptive evidence). I’m grateful to David Sobel for bringing this point to
my attention.
22
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successfully arrive at knowledge. More specifically, many agents considering moral questions just
haven’t successfully used the kind of higher level reasoning required to adequately draw conclusions
on the basis of E. Lastly, if one held both (a) and (b), one would say that the reason why moral
knowledge or justification is harder to obtain is that moral issues both require greater time and
more complex reasoning in order to successfully arrive at a justified belief or knowledge.
In general, this unified account could explain the initial asymmetries in the following way. If
moral beliefs are hard with respect to (a) and (b), and moral expertise requires one to have an high
amount of evidence and evaluate it extremely well when reaching certain moral beliefs, then moral
expertise would be hard to come by. Likewise, given (a) and (b) reliable testifiers would be hard to
come by. And, lastly, if it is difficult to assess moral claims in the ways (a) and (b) outline, moral
disagreement can lead to skepticism by causing one to lose the evidence one may have had or
undermining one’s ability to work through the now-competing evidence one has.
Are either of these mechanisms a good explanation of the epistemic difficulty of morality? I
think that they are not. Remember here that in order for this rival explanation to explain why
moral beliefs have certain epistemic puzzles that non-moral beliefs don’t, the mechanisms it points
to need to be distinctive of moral beliefs. This is because the explanation we are seeking is one that
explains how there are certain di ferences between issues in moral and non-moral epistemology. The
reason why this rival account fails is simply because the mechanisms it picks out are not distinctive.
To see why, we can consider the following pair of moral and non-moral beliefs:
(NM2): Kyrie is a college freshman taking an applied ethics course and after one
month in the course has just been told that many animals were killed last year for
their meat, as well as the fact that many animals (e.g. mice, rabbits, and moles) are
killed each year in producing and maintaining crops for food that all vegetarians
depend on. Kyrie considers the question of whether being vegetarian kills more
animals than being a meat-eater does. After consulting a few reliable yet neutral
sources (e.g. peer-reviewed scientific journals, not PETA) on each side of the debate
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and crunching the numbers, Kyrie forms the belief that being vegetarian kills more
animals than being a meat-eater.
(M2): Kyrie is a college freshman taking an applied ethics course and after one
month in the course has learnt about arguments both for and against eating meat,
considering only arguments for its permissibility and impermissibility (not its
obligatoriness), and considering the same quantity (e.g. one each) and quality (e.g.
both valid, with plausible premises) of arguments for each side, from a credible yet
neutral source (e.g. the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Kyrie considers the
question of whether eating meat is morally permissible or morally impermissible.
Without consulting anyone else, and after carefully considering the arguments,
Kyrie forms the belief that eating meat is morally permissible.
In these cases, it’s clear that the non-moral belief is difficult with respect to (a): Kyrie would
need to spend a lot of time working collecting the relevant data about the statistics of animal deaths
in crop cultivation and meat farms. It’s also the case that each belief is difficult with respect to (b):
Kyrie would need to engage in some high-level reasoning such as higher-level math to work
through all of the information on statistics he had gathered. And, as this account stipulates, the
moral belief is likewise difficult with respect to (a) and (b). Yet, it seems that the moral belief still
lacks the same kind of epistemic credit that their non-moral belief has (for example, it appears to be
less justified).23 Moreover, upon reflection is it simply not true that morality is the only domain of
inquiry that requires a great amount of time or complex reasoning to arrive at knowledge or
justified beliefs within that domain: various complex scientific questions also require these. So, even
though this account is unified, it does not succeed in accounting for the asymmetries of moral and
non-moral epistemology.

At this point one may object that we would not have the judgment that the moral belief is less justified here if the
non-moral belief were to be some controversial scientific claim. First, notice that the non-moral belief presented is
controversial: Riggins is confronting conflicting accounts of the number of animals killed. Second, in order for the cases
to be analogous, if the controversial scientific claim considered is abstract and general, so must the moral claim, which
would force us to consider a new moral case as well (e.g., if we are to consider a controversial scientific theory we would
need to consider a controversial moral theory); here, both beliefs are controversial and concrete in nature.
23

16

However, defenders of this alternative account may object. They might insist that the kind
of reasoning required for moral beliefs is always going to be more demanding or complex than that
required for any other domain of inquiry, as it’s of its own special kind, unlike any other type of
reasoning used in any other domain. For example, perhaps moral knowledge requires a special kind
of sense that other domains don’t, which is itself extremely complex. But it’s terribly ad hoc to posit a
special kind of moral reasoning just to save this account. Moreover, this seems to just put a name to
the problem, rather than offering an explanation of it. We started by observing that moral
knowledge is hard to come by. It won’t do to end simply by observing that the kind of reasoning
that leads to moral knowledge is also hard to come by. We would still want to know why this is.
We’ve just seen why this Morality is Hard explanation fails. In the next section, I’ll explain
why the other competing explanation won’t work either.
3.2. Morality’s Many Defeaters
Another unified explanation for the issues in moral epistemology claims that the reason
why moral beliefs lack the kind of epistemic credit like knowledge and justification that non-moral
beliefs have is because moral beliefs typically come with more defeaters than non-moral beliefs do.
There are two ways of understanding this defeaters account. On one way of understanding it, the
accounts turns out not to be a genuine rival to my Higher Standards account. On another
understanding, although it is a genuine rival, it results in counterintuitive conclusions, and so ought
to be rejected. First, let me briefly explain the relevant notion of defeaters in play.
Defeaters come in roughly two kinds: rebutting and undercutting defeaters.24 On an
evidentialist picture, rebutting defeaters are those that serve as reason to believe a proposition that’s
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See Pollock (1986).
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incompatible with one’s conclusion from the evidence (e.g. d is a defeater that warrants not-p (on
the basis of E) when one was originally warranted in concluding p on the basis of E), while
undercutting defeaters serve as reason to believe that E does not actually itself warrant p, without
providing reason to believe the negation of p. Given this characterization, one way to understand
defeaters is as a kind of higher-order evidence, that is, evidence about the character of one’s
(first-order) evidence.25 For example, consider your belief that the apple is red that you formed on
the basis of your perception of the apple appearing red to you. Your belief would be accompanied by
the first type of defeater if you were told that you were given an inverted color spectrum drug: in
this case, the fact that you were given such a drug means that you now have, on the basis of your
perception, a reason to believe that the apple is green, not red. It is evidence that your original
first-order evidence--your perception--actually does not warrant p (that the apple is red), but rather
warrants a proposition incompatible with p (that the apple is green). In this case we can say that
your total evidence consisting of E+d warrants not-p. Your belief would be accompanied by the
second type of defeater if you were told that there’s a 50/50 chance that you were given an inverted
color spectrum drug: in this case, your original evidence for your belief that the apple is red (your
visual perception) would be insufficient evidence for your original belief, such that you ought to
abstain from believing what color the apple is. In this case we can say that your total evidence
consisting of E+d fails to warrant p.
Now, for the opponent who wants to claim that the grounds of the issues in moral
epistemology is that moral beliefs typically have more defeaters than non-moral beliefs, they must
not only point to defeaters that accompany moral beliefs, but also point to ones that are speci ic to

See Christensen (2010) and Lasonen-Aarnio (2014). Of course, this doesn’t automatically bar higher-order evidence
from also functioning as first-order evidence. See Feldman (2005) for an articulation of this view.
25

18

moral beliefs such that non-moral beliefs either don’t also typically have them or don’t typically
have them to the same degree. Otherwise such defeaters would not account for the di ference in
epistemic credit between moral and non-moral beliefs. Given this constraint, there are a few
considerations one might cite. One might point to the fact that there is a lot of disagreement
surrounding moral claims, much more than what typically surrounds non-moral claims. Likewise,
one might argue that there are more counter-arguments to consider with respect to moral claims
than non-moral claims. With each of these options, one could claim that one’s (first-order)
evidence E doesn’t yield a justified moral belief or knowledge because any of these considerations
would serve as a kind of defeater for E, either in the sense that it makes E insufficient to warrant the
belief that p, or that it makes E warrant the belief that not-p: either way, one’s total evidence
consisting of E+d fails to make one epistemically justified in believing p or knowledge that p. For
example, consider a case where I originally believe that eating meat is morally permissible, but then
come across another rational person (perhaps even with all the same non-moral evidence that I
have) who disagrees with me and who instead believes that eating meat is morally impermissible.
One could claim that that’s a reason to think that my original evidence E is not sufficient to justify
me in believing that eating meat is morally permissible, such that I should abstain from believing it.
In this case, the fact of this disagreement undercuts my (first-order) evidence E to believe that
eating meat is morally permissible; thus, my total evidence consisting of E+d would fail to make my
belief that eating meat is morally permissible epistemically justified. In this way, even if an agent
had roughly the same amount of first-order evidence for both her moral and non-moral beliefs, her
moral belief would be less justified because there would be more defeaters present, and so more
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reasons that make it the case that E is not sufficient to warrant her moral belief. The total evidence
the agents typically have for moral and non-moral beliefs is not the same.
At this point we need to consider precisely how defeaters function to make one’s evidence
insufficient to warrant one’s belief that p. On one understanding, defeaters (or, more specifically,
the fact of disagreement in the moral case) function by raising a specific possibility that my belief is
false. For example, maybe eating meat is morally impermissible after all, given that (so many)
reasonable others think so; perhaps I made a mistake in my reasoning, or succumbed to bias. On
this understanding, while defeaters undermine my (first-order) evidence E for my belief that p such
that my total evidence of E+d is no longer sufficient to justify p, they do this by introducing
additional ways in which my belief could be false, that is, possibilities. On this account, defeaters just
introduce or make relevant certain kinds of epistemic possibilities, ones that are not ruled out by
one’s evidence (given that, if it could be ruled out, it wouldn’t render E insufficient to justify p).
For example, consider our previous example involving the belief that the apple is red, where
one’s evidence consists of the perception of the apple appearing red, and the defeater that’s present
is the fact that there’s a 50/50 chance one was given an inverted color-spectrum drug. On the
proposed understanding of what defeaters are, the fact that there’s a 50/50 chance that one was
given an inverted color-spectrum drug introduces a new possibility that the apple is not red (more
specifically, that it’s green). However, since one’s evidence--namely, one’s perception--is not able to
rule out this possibility, one’s belief fails to be justified or count as knowledge.
At this point, talk of possibilities should sound familiar to the attentive reader. This is
because epistemic standards were originally understood as specifying epistemic possibilities that
must be ruled out in order for a subject’s belief to count as justified or knowledge. Remember again
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that this is just to say that the more rigorous the standard, the greater the set of epistemic
possibilities. So, if defeaters are just relevant epistemic possibilities--specifically, ones that one’s
evidence is unable to render sufficiently improbable--then one who holds that there are generally
more defeaters for moral beliefs than non-moral beliefs is committed to the view that moral beliefs
generally have higher epistemic standards.
To further understand how this 'More Defeaters' view is not a rival view to my favored
'Higher Standards' view, consider the following model.

On this model, let the box indicate the set of all epistemic possibilities. Let the ‘P’ circle indicate the
possible worlds in which p is true, and the ‘E’ circle indicate the worlds that are compatible with
one’s evidence; all of the space outside of these circles consists of not-p worlds. Using our case, we
can understand the ‘t1’ line as indicating the epistemic standard at the time before the defeater was
introduced (before you were told that there’s a 50/50 chance you were given an inverted color
spectrum drug), while the ‘t2’ line indicates the epistemic standard at the time after the defeater was
introduced. The epistemic standard at t1 indicates all of the possible worlds one needs to rule out at
t1 in order to count as having a justified belief that p (namely all of those worlds above the ‘standard
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at t1’ line), while the epistemic standard at t2 indicates all of the possible worlds one needs to rule
out at t2 in order to count as having a justified belief that p (all of the worlds above the ‘standard at
t2’ line). The standard at t1 is pretty low: it indicates, roughly, that one can fail to rule out all of the
not-p worlds that fall below it while still having a justified belief that p. However, at t2 the standard
increases, becoming more stringent, thus indicating, roughly, that one can fail to rule out only those
not-p worlds that fall below it while still having a justified belief that p. Importantly, though, while
at t1 (pre-defeater) there are no not-p worlds that are compatible with your evidence (that is, there
are no worlds that are inside the E circle but outside the P circle), at t2 (post defeater) there are; this
means that while your belief meets the epistemic standard at t1, it fails to meet it at t2, such that
while you have a justified belief or know that p at t1, you have an unjustified belief or fail to know
that p at t2. In the end, this particular interpretation of the More Defeaters view is not a rival
account to my Higher Standards account. In this way, rather than denying that moral beliefs enjoy
higher epistemic standards than non-moral beliefs, this More Defeaters view is just specifying a
specific way in which the standard is higher, or how it is that the standard is higher for moral beliefs
(or, more specifically, what makes a possibility one an agent must be able to rule out). But, again,
they are not disagreeing about the fact that the epistemic standard is higher for moral beliefs.
However, there remains an interpretation of the More Defeaters view that is a genuine
competing alternative to my Higher Standards view. On this alternative understanding, defeaters
(or, more specifically, the fact of disagreement in the moral case) function to make one’s evidence
insufficient to warrant one’s belief that p by directly affecting one’s evidence. It is not that the
standard becomes more rigorous, but just that one falls farther from it given the reduced strength of
one’s evidence. On this account, the epistemic standards for moral and non-moral beliefs could be
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exactly the same and remain fixed, but yet moral beliefs are more epistemically problematic because
one’s evidence is comparatively worse in the moral domain.
Importantly, for this view to capture cases of comparative lack of justification and not just
knowledge for moral beliefs, it would have to be the case that the relevant defeaters are recognized
or possessed by the agent. This is because although some hold that the simple existence of
defeaters--in this case, the simple existence of moral disagreement--is enough to undermine
knowledge, it is widely held that in order to affect justification, the agent herself must be confronted
with the defeater or made aware of it.26
The problem with this account is that while it seems correct to say that justification is
undermined by defeaters only when agents are cognizant of them for non-moral cases, in the moral
case lack of awareness of the defeater doesn’t make justification easier. This understanding of the
More Defeaters view would implausibly conclude that in cases where agents just aren’t aware of
such disagreement concerning a moral issue (for example, because they live in very isolated
homogeneous communities, or never bothered to ask anyone else their opinion on the matter),
their moral beliefs would not be suffer a loss of justification. Likewise, if all that is required to be a
moral expert is to have a sufficiently high volume of justified moral beliefs, then one could become a
moral expert quite easily. But this is very counterintuitive. So, while this understanding of defeaters
can explain some cases, it cannot explain all the puzzles that would need to be explained.
In the end, then, the More Defeaters view either is not a genuine rival to my Higher
Standards view, or is rife with counterexamples, and so ought to be rejected.

Defeaters that undermine justification are commonly referred to as “mental state defeaters,” as opposed to
“propositional defeaters” which are not believed by the agent and only undermine knowledge. See Bergmann (2006) on
mental state and propositional defeaters.
26
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4. Different but Equal?
Even if the first understanding of the More Defeaters view is not incompatible with my
favored Higher Standards view, we might still wonder why one should favor my account. After all,
if both accounts explain initial puzzles about moral beliefs, and do so by appealing to epistemic
possibilities, then why should we say that what explains this difference is that moral beliefs have a
higher epistemic standard, rather than that they are accompanied by more defeaters?
For example, some may think that my Higher Standards view sacrifices important intuitions
regarding the relation between evidence and defeaters by always viewing defeaters as relevant
possibilities. On my view, the relationship between evidence and defeaters involves the
introduction of new epistemic possibilities. This makes it seem as though while one’s epistemic
position worsens, one’s evidence doesn’t worsen at all--that is, one’s epistemic position worsens
despite one’s evidence not worsening at all. But this seems to sacrifice a very intuitive thought that
one’s evidence gets worse with the presence of defeaters. Instead of raising epistemic standards,
defeaters are typically conceptualized under the second interpretation of the More Defeaters view,
wherein they render one’s belief insufficiently justified by just simply reducing the strength of what
serves as one’s justification, for example one’s evidence. Intuitively, we think that when one is told
that there’s a 50/50 chance that one was given an inverted color spectrum drug, it’s not just that
one’s belief now fails to be justified, but that one’s evidence has gotten worse, and fails to be justified
because one’s evidence has gotten worse. On a probabilistic model of evidence, the thought is as
follows: while initially one’s evidence may have made p probable to degree .9, when a defeater is
introduced one’s evidence now makes p probable to degree .5. However, as noted, this
understanding of how one’s evidence has gotten worse when a defeater is present is compatible
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with epistemic standards remaining at the same level. So, it might seem as though my Higher
Standards account cannot account for the commonsensical thought that when defeaters get
introduced one’s evidence becomes worse.
While I agree that it would be problematic for my view if it was unable to account for this
commonsensical thought, I don’t believe that it faces this problem. To see this, we should return to
our model. On a standard probability model, a defeater just functions to make E smaller (in other
words, by making the not-p space bigger), where a certain probability is specified for an epistemic
standard, and the probability that p is determined as follows (assuming for simplicity only finitely
many possible worlds):
Pr (p) = number of p-worlds in E / total number of worlds in E
There is, however, an alternative way to think of how defeaters affect probability. On my
model, it’s true that when a defeater is introduced, the degree to which one’s evidence makes p
probable decreases. Rather than utilizing the above standard model of probability, though, my
fallibilist view amends it as follows:
Pr (p) = number of p-worlds in E above tn / total number of worlds in E above tn
While on this model of probability it’s true that one’s evidence is worse in the sense of yielding a
lower probability of p at t2 (post-defeater) than at t1 (pre-defeater), it has gotten worse precisely
because the standard has gone up. So, this alternative model can show how the probability of p
given one’s evidence has gotten worse when a defeater is present in a way that doesn’t make the
raising of epistemic standards irrelevant. Since my proposed way of understanding defeaters in
terms of possibilities can accommodate the sense in which one’s evidence has gotten worse when a
defeater is introduced, it ought not be abandoned
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Another reason to favor my Higher Standards account is if it explains some cases that this
interpretation of the More Defeaters account doesn’t. Some of this may turn on the precise
theoretical explanation for the higher epistemic standard; for example, if we endorse a kind of
impurist view wherein the practical stakes of holding a belief affects the degree of justification the
belief has, then the More Defeaters view would be an insufficient explanation of the degree of
justification. To see why this would be the case, take the classic bank cases as an example.27 Here, the
proposition that the bank could’ve changed its hours isn’t properly characterized as a defeater, since
it’s not properly characterized as higher-order evidence (that is, it’s not evidence that your first
order evidence (that you were at the bank last Saturday) does not warrant your belief (that the bank
is open on Saturdays). Rather, something like the proposition that you were only dreaming that you
were at the bank last Saturday would be higher-order evidence. If we should conceive of the way
justification is determined for moral beliefs as analogous to the bank cases (namely where the
possibilities an agent must be able to rule out in order to have a justified moral belief is partly
determined by what’s practically at stake in holding the belief), then this More Defeaters view will
be ruled out as the best explanation.
Moreover, it can also be said that in so far as defeaters introduce just one type of epistemic
possibilities, or hold that epistemic possibilities can be introduced in just one way, my Higher
Standards view will be able to explain more cases, and more diverse cases, as epistemic possibilities
are introduced in multiple ways (the presence of disagreement isn’t the only way to introduce a
possibility). These are all reasons to favor my Higher Standards account over the first interpretation

27

See DeRose (1992) for the original bank cases.
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of the More Defeaters account, even if the More Defeaters view is not a genuine rival to my favored
Higher Standards view.

6. Conclusion
Moral testimony, moral expertise, and moral disagreement have all been thought to be
distinctively problematic--that is, problematic in ways non-moral testimony, non-moral expertise,
and non-moral disagreement are not. Previous explanations of their problematic nature have been
piecemeal in nature, seeking to explain why each issue is problematic in isolation. In this paper, I’ve
offered a unifying explanation of the problematic nature of these issues, the Higher Standards
account, thus departing from previous explanatory accounts of these phenomena. According to this
unified account, the relative epistemically problematic nature of moral testimony, moral expertise,
and moral disagreement is explained by the fact that moral beliefs typically enjoy a higher epistemic
standard than non-moral beliefs. After first explaining my Higher Standards account, I considered
two rival unified accounts that would explain the problematic nature of moral testimony, moral
expertise, and moral disagreement, namely the Morality is Hard view and the More Defeaters view.
I argued that these accounts were either rife with counterexamples, were ad hoc, or reduced to a
variant of my view, concluding that my Higher Standards account is the best unifying explanation
on offer.
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Chapter 2
“Moral Stakes, Higher Standards”

0. Introduction
How easy is it to have a justified moral belief? At first glance, one may feel inclined to
answer that it is just as easy or difficult as holding any other kind of justified belief. However, this
seems to be the minority view. Rather, there are commonly thought to be important asymmetries
between moral and non-moral beliefs, and moral and non-moral epistemology more generally.
Importantly, these asymmetries are often conceived of as kinds of epistemic obstacles, thus having a
detrimental effect on the epistemic credentials of our moral beliefs. In other words, moral beliefs are
commonly thought to be distinct in the way that epistemic values like justification and knowledge
are harder to gain. For example, while it’s commonly assumed that non-moral testimony is a
perfectly innocuous way to gain non-moral knowledge, moral testimony seems quite objectionable.
28

Likewise, while non-moral disagreement poses no serious threat to the possibility of non-moral

knowledge, moral disagreement has been thought to entail moral skepticism.29 And, lastly, while it’s
uncontroversial that there are all kinds of non-moral experts, the existence of moral experts has
seemed quite dubious.30

For defenses of the asymmetry of testimony see Crisp (2014); Hills (2009); Hopkins (2007); Howell (2014); McGrath
(2009); Mogensen (2015); and Nickel (2001).
29
For example, Tolhurst (1987) argues that it makes our moral beliefs never justified, while McGrath (2007) and
Vavova (2014) both argue that disagreement leads to skepticism about a certain subset of our moral beliefs.
30
For arguments noting issues with moral expertise see Cholbi (2007), McGrath (2011) and (2007), and Ryle (1958).
28
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Given the apparent way in which epistemic values like justification and knowledge are less
easy to come by for moral beliefs, one may wonder what explains this asymmetry. Perhaps the most
intuitively plausible explanation, and the one that I favor, is that the epistemic standard for moral
beliefs is typically higher than that of non-moral beliefs. Put most generally, this means that
typically one must be in a better epistemic position to receive a certain kind of epistemic value or
credit (knowledge, justification) for a moral belief than that that needed in order to receive the same
epistemic value or credit for a non-moral belief. For example, on an evidentialist model this
amounts to saying that one generally needs stronger evidence to have a justified moral belief than to
have a justified non-moral belief. Importantly, this explanation has the advantage of being the only
unified account of the aforementioned epistemic asymmetries on offer. The focus of this paper,
though, is not what best accounts for the widely noted apparent epistemic asymmetries between
moral and non-moral beliefs--that is, it is not whether moral beliefs typically have a higher
epistemic standard--for I argue for this claim elsewhere.31 Rather, the focus is on the question that
remains once (or if) one accepts the claim that what explains these asymmetries is the fact that
moral beliefs typically have a higher epistemic standard: namely, what functions to make the
epistemic standard for moral beliefs higher? In this paper, I will put forth a theoretical account of
how the epistemic standard for moral beliefs is typically higher which vindicates the apparent
epistemic asymmetries between moral and non-moral beliefs.
In seeking an explanation of how it is that moral beliefs standardly fail to be epistemically on
a par with non-moral beliefs, investigating theories of justification that fundamentally hold that the
standard is not stable across all beliefs and all epistemic agents but rather changes depending on
More specifically, in “Harder, Better, Faster, Stronger: Epistemic Standards and Moral Beliefs,”, I argue that a higher
standards account is the best unifying account that accommodates this data about the asymmetry.
31
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certain situational factors would be the most initially plausible place to look. Two of these views of
knowledge and justification—namely contextualism and subject sensitive invariantism—hold that
32

knowing or having a justified belief is not solely a matter of the evidential position the agent is in,
for two agents who are in the same position in regards to evidence can vary in terms of knowledge
and justification.33 By looking at these two types of theories wherein epistemic standards change
depending on certain non-evidential situational features, one can see how the epistemic standards
may be different for moral beliefs.34 Although these theories hold that non-evidential factors affect
our claims about knowledge and justification generally, I will argue that there are specific
non-evidential factors that affect the justification of moral beliefs in particular. What I mean by this
is that what it is to be epistemically justified in holding a moral belief is not wholly a matter of
evidential factors, and that the non-evidential factors that partly determine whether or not one is
justified in holding a moral belief are characteristic of moral beliefs. These non-evidential factors
make it such that the standard of justification for moral beliefs is different--standardly higher--than
that of other, non-moral beliefs, and that this is due to the fact that these non-evidential factors are

Throughout the paper I will focus on putting epistemic justification in terms of evidentialism, since putting it in these
terms is perhaps the most straightforward or simple way of making the points I want to make, and since one view that I
discuss at length, namely subject sensitive invariantism, is put in a way that directly contrasts with a simple evidentialist
picture. However, I should also note that what I say concerning views of epistemic justification which take the standards
to be rigid is open to encompassing certain epistemic states, such as how reliable one is, as being what determines
whether or not one is justified instead of what evidence one has.
33
This epistemic position, of which contextualism and subject sensitive invariantism are two particular views, is known
as Impurism. It contrasts with Purism, which holds that provided that two agents are in the same epistemic position
(e.g. have the same evidence), they are in the same position to know (e.g. both know that p). See Fantl and McGrath
(2009) for this distinction.
34
Since my arguments will not focus on the semantic commitments of each view, I will not be considering relativism.
As the reader will see, my arguments revolve around how a theory can encapsulate the right kinds of and persons’
practical interests, in which case relativism and contextualism would be on a par (since, setting aside semantic
differences, there would be no significant differences between contextualism and relativism). See MacFarlane (2014) for
a relativist view.
32
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essentially moral in nature.35 Importantly, my focus and assessment in this paper will not be on
which view is the best account of epistemic standards in general, but rather on which account can
best answer this question in moral epistemology by accounting for data that is particular to the
moral domain. Surprisingly, these theories in particular and work on epistemic standards in general
have failed to be utilized by moral epistemologists interested in the apparent asymmetry between
moral and non-moral beliefs.36 I seek to rectify this unfortunate gap in this paper.
This paper will proceed as follows: First, I will introduce contextualism and
subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI) as general accounts of how epistemic standards are fixed. I then
proceed to consider specific adaptations of each theory for the moral domain, examining ways in
which each theory can account for the higher standard of moral beliefs. Crucially, in order to
adequately account for the asymmetry in epistemic standards--that moral beliefs typically have a
higher epistemic standard than non-moral beliefs--the feature the theory locates as the
standard-fixing feature must be distinctive of moral beliefs.37 After rejecting a particular traditional
contextualist view, I argue that what is key in accounting for the higher standard of moral beliefs is
that the theory situates practical interests--specifically, those that are constitutive of morality as a
subject matter--as what functions to fix the epistemic standard. While this notion is typically
associated with SSI, I argue that there are certain shortcomings with it as typically formulated, and,

To be clear, I am not arguing that every single moral belief requires more evidence to be justified than every single
non-moral belief, but rather just that the standard case is such that moral beliefs require more evidence to be justified
than non-moral beliefs.
36
Although Timmons (2004) puts forth a contextualist moral epistemology, he’s largely concerned with providing an
account of how we can have morally basic beliefs—that is, moral beliefs that do not stand in need of justification, rather
than in providing a theoretical account of the higher standard of moral beliefs, or in accounting for the apparent
asymmetries between moral and non-moral beliefs more generally.
37
It’s important to note that the constraint is not that the theory must locate a feature that is solely had by moral beliefs
in the sense that it is in principle impossible to be had by non-moral beliefs. For one, it would be hard to specify such a
feature or property in a non-circular way (i.e. other than the feature of being a moral belief). Rather, minimally, it must
be a feature that is had to a greater (or lesser) extent by moral beliefs.
35
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moreover, that the contextualist can also incorporate practical interests in her view. In the end, I
put forth versions of both SSI and contextualism that are plausible accounts of the higher standard
of justification for moral beliefs, arguing that there is a particular contextualist view that best
accounts for the distinctive features of moral beliefs. Importantly, given the practical interest
framework of both views that I put forth, it turns out that the higher standard of justification for
moral beliefs is due to essentially moral features of moral beliefs.38

1. The Contenders
1.1. Contextualism
Contextualism is a theory of knowledge and justification that states that whether or not one
knows or is justified is partly determined by (non-evidential) situational factors. In the case of
contextualism, these factors are those in the context of utterance or use of a knowledge ascription:
whether or not a subject S knows that p is a matter of meeting certain epistemic standards that are
fixed by the context in which a speaker makes a knowledge claim. Importantly, the situational
factors don’t determine whether or not one knows or is justified directly, but rather indirectly by
way of determining which epistemic standards are in play: different situational features, different
epistemic standards. Exactly which epistemic standards are the relevant ones, however, is not a
settled matter, for even while accepting that the epistemic standards change with context there is
39

disagreement as to what the content of these standards is, or what these standards amount to. In

What I mean by this is that it is due to features of morality as a subject matter, instead of accidental features (e.g.
merely contextual features).
39
For example, Heller (1995) argues that how reliable one must be to know is fixed by the context, while Cohen (1986)
argues that an agent must be able to rule out salient counterpossibilities, and that context fixes which possibilities are
salient.
38
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this way, contextualism generally speaking does not hold one to an internalist or externalist theory
of justification, and so can be held alongside or applied to whatever theory of justification one
subscribes to.
One of the main virtues of contextualism is its ability to handle our intuitions concerning
claims about knowledge and justification in skeptical scenarios. We normally think that we know
certain facts about the external world, at least on a general, everyday basis, even though we are not
able to defeat the skeptic (at least not on her own grounds). However, many of us also have the
thought that when engaged in a philosophical discussion about skepticism, we fall short of
knowledge. How can this be? The explanation offered by the contextualist is that the epistemic
standards that one must meet in order to qualify as knowing shift when the context shifts from that
of an ordinary, everyday one to a philosophical one. In this way, even though one has the same
evidence, is equally reliable, etc., in both scenarios, one has knowledge in one case while failing to
have knowledge in the other.
Importantly, contextualism is first and foremost a semantic theory about sentences with
epistemic terms like “know” or “justified”. Contextualists hold that these kinds of epistemic terms
function as context-sensitive expressions just as “I” and “tall” do. What proposition is expressed by
an utterance of “S knows that p” changes with a relevant change in context. Because of this, the
truth value of the same utterance of “S knows that p” can change depending on the context in which
it is uttered, which is what allows for the judgment that in the ordinary case one knows that one has
hands while in the discussion of skepticism one does not.
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An attentive reader will notice that this is a sloppy way of making the contextualist point, which has been prone to
criticism: strictly speaking, we would have to say that the sentence "S knows that p" is true in the ordinary context and
40
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Before assessing whether or not contextualism can provide an adequate explanation of how
the standard of justification differs for moral beliefs as compared to non-moral beliefs, I will first
introduce another epistemic theory that takes non-evidential situational features to figure
essentially into claims about knowledge and justification: subject sensitive invariantism.
2.2. Subject Sensitive Invariantism
Like contextualism, subject sensitive invariantism (SSI) is a theory of knowledge and
justification which holds that whether or not one knows or is justified is partly determined by
41

non-evidential situational factors. In this way, both agree that whether or not one knows or is
justified in believing is not solely a matter of the evidential position an agent is in. Rather, two
agents who are on evidentially equal grounds can nevertheless vary with respect to knowledge and
justification.
More specifically, SSI holds that it is the subject’s practical interests, or what the subject of the
knowledge/justification attribution has at stake practically speaking, that constrain whether or not
she knows/is justified in believing. The basic notion of SSI can be put in terms of the following
principle:
SSI: S is justified in believing that p only if S is rational to act as if p.
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false in the skeptical one. I will not take up these issues here, but am rather just following Lewis’s (1996) explication of
contextualism.
41
See Fantl and McGrath (2002), (2007) and (2009), and Stanley (2005). Stanley takes his account to only concern
knowledge (see pp. 88-9), but Fantl and McGrath (2002) put the theory specifically in terms of justification. Stanley
refers to his theory as “Interest Relative Invariantism,” while Fantl and McGrath use “pragmatic encroachment”. The
label of “subject sensitive invariantism” for these views is due to DeRose (2004).
42
This formulation of SSI is taken from Fantl and McGrath (2002) p. 78. To clarify: the rationality of acting as if p is
determined relative to the subject’s preferences and the actual situation they are presently in (that is, not just any
situation one could imagine). See also Fantl and McGrath (2009) pp.59-60 for similar principles connecting knowledge
to action.
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The arguments made on behalf of SSI usually appeal to particular cases in which two agents
stand in the same evidential position yet have different relevant practical interests, or differences in
43

what is at stake for them in being wrong (having a false belief), and we think that only one is
justified or has knowledge, while the other lacks it. For example, in Knowledge and Practical Interests,
Jason Stanley presents a case where an agent is trying to determine whether they should deposit
their check today, a Friday, when the line at the bank is long, or tomorrow, a Saturday.44 In the first
case, the agent has no impending bills, and would rather not wait in line today but deposit their
check tomorrow, and so they say to themselves, having been at the bank on Saturday two weeks
ago, “I know the bank will be open tomorrow.” In the second case, the agent has a very important
impending bill and very little money in their account currently, and so, even though they were at
the bank on Saturday two weeks ago, thinks to themselves “I don’t know the bank is open
tomorrow”—after all, banks do change their hours.
We have the intuition that the agents in these cases attribute to themselves the correct
epistemic status concerning knowledge. If we stick to the belief that knowledge and justification are
invariable and only concern purely evidentially relevant factors, these intuitions will be puzzling
and inexplicable. For evidentialism holds that in so far as evidence E is sufficient to justify one in
believing, or constitute one knowing, that p in one case, it is sufficient to justify or count as
knowledge for anyone else who is similarly evidentially situated in the same kind of circumstance.
SSI offers a clean and principled way of explaining these intuitions, and why they are right: we

Stanley (2005) puts his view in terms of the threshold of knowledge being determined with respect to the (practical)
cost of being wrong: in order to know, the probability of the alternatives to p must be sufficiently low, where the agent’s
interests determine which alternatives are in play and the threshold of being sufficiently improbable is determined by
the practical costs of being wrong.
44
This bank case is originally from DeRose (1992) which he used to argue on behalf of contextualism. Stanley offers
several varieties of the bank case, some of which he argues are accommodated on SSI but not contextualism.
43
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think that it is rational for the low-stakes agent to act as if p, while we think it would be irrational
for the high-stakes agent to do the same (again, even though they are in the same position in
regards to their evidence!), which indicates that in one case S knows while in the other S does not.
Importantly, there are some key differences between contextualism and SSI even though
they both agree that certain non-evidential contextual features at least partly determine whether or
not an agent knows. Perhaps the biggest difference concerns the semantic commitments of each.
Recall here that contextualism is a semantic thesis about knowledge attributions which holds that
the meaning of epistemic terms like “knowledge” and “justification” is determined by (certain
features of) the context of use, which makes it such that the same sentence of “S knows that p”
actually expresses different propositions in different contexts. SSI, however, holds that the same
proposition is expressed by “S knows that p” relative to every context of use. Rather, it is just that
there are additional non-evidential factors, i.e. a subject’s practical interests, which determine
whether or not one knows (namely, a subject’s practical interests determine whether or not the
truth conditions of the knowledge proposition are met (i.e. whether they make it rational to act as if
45

p)). Secondly, the views differ with respect to who or which context knowledge attributions are
judged relative to: while for contextualism what matters is features in the context of utterance, for
SSI it is the subject’s practical interests.

3. How Higher?

Again, for Stanley interests determine knowledge all the way down (both in terms of the alternatives one needs to
consider and the threshold of probability these alternatives must meet). In so far as an agent’s practical interests remain
the same across contexts, then, the epistemic standards one must meet do not change (even if, say, other alternatives are
made salient, etc.).
45
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Now that we have both contextualism and SSI in view we should turn to the question of
what could function to raise the epistemic standard of justification for moral beliefs on each model.
3.1. Contextualism and Relevant Alternatives
While contextualist views come in many shapes and stripes, the traditional and perhaps
most popular contextualist model is the Relevant Alternatives model (RA). According to RA, whether
or not an agent knows (that p) is determined by whether they are able to rule out a certain set of
relevant alternatives (of not-p).46 RA is a contextualist view because it holds that whether an
alternative is relevant can vary from context (of utterance) to context (of utterance): it is not that
the same alternatives are relevant for any and every knowledge attribution. Where contextualist RA
views vary is along what makes an alternative relevant in a context, for example whether it must be
asserted or otherwise entered into the conversational score, whether it must be presupposed or part
of the common ground of a conversation, or whether it just needs to be attended to by the utterer. 47
If we were to adopt the RA model of contextualism to explain the higher standard of
justification for moral beliefs, we would have to meet several constraints: first, say what it is that
makes an alternative to a moral belief relevant, and secondly, be sure that the phenomenon that we
locate as making an alternative relevant for moral beliefs is had to a much greater extent by moral
beliefs (such that counterpossibilities are typically made salient in the case of moral beliefs but not

See Lewis (1979) and (1996), Goldman (1976), and Dretske (1970) as classic papers on the RA approach. Of course,
contextualists have differed with respect to what is required by ‘ruling out’ a certain alternative as well, whether that just
requires that the agent’s evidence rules out not-p, or whether the agent must actually be able to do or say something
against the particular possibility of not-p (for the latter, see Wellman (1971) and Annis (1978) on the
Challenge-Response Model).
47
See Blome-Tillman (2009) for the view that the alternatives that are relevant are those that are pragmatically
presupposed. There are also interest models of relevance, which hold that what makes an alternative relevant depends
on the assessor’s concerns or interests (see Heller (1999) for an early model). The interest RA model will be discussed in
section 3.4.
46
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for non-moral beliefs). This is because (perhaps obviously) if the alternatives-raising phenomenon
we identify is also present to the same extent in non-moral belief contexts, then even though we
would be able to account for the epistemic standard being high for moral beliefs, we wouldn’t be
able to account for the di ference in the epistemic standard (since we would just have to conclude
that the standard for non-moral beliefs is high as well). Importantly, though, the constraint is not
that the theory must locate a feature that is solely had by moral beliefs in the sense that it is in
principle impossible to be had by non-moral beliefs, for that would be much too demanding for the
task at hand.
One possible standards-raising phenomenon the RA contextualist can appeal to is the
oft-cited phenomenon of moral disagreement. First, moral disagreement would explain what makes
an alternative relevant: when an agent would come across others who disagree with them over a
moral matter, the disagreement would function to introduce an alternative into the conversational
score. Secondly, the fact that there is widespread disagreement about what is right and wrong, and
that there is more disagreement about morality than about, say, whether Syracuse is a city in New
York, makes it so that the epistemic standards are typically raised for moral beliefs, since there are
more alternatives or counterpossibilities that are made salient and made salient more often by the
fact of moral disagreement. This explanation would suffice to show how the standard of
justification for moral beliefs is higher than that for non-moral beliefs: it both stipulates what
functions to raise the standard, and locates a phenomenon of alternative-raising that is unique to
moral beliefs (or at least more common with moral beliefs).
In spite of its initial plausibility, this contextualist strategy is not a good explanation of why
and how it is that the standard of justification for moral beliefs is higher than that for non-moral
38

beliefs. The significant problem with this picture is that it generates the intuitively wrong extension
for justified beliefs: namely, it holds that agents who intuitively don’t have justified moral beliefs do.
Under the current model, it is the fact of disagreement that functions to raise the epistemic standard
that one must meet in order to be justified: the more disagreement there is in the context of
utterance, the more alternatives are made relevant, and so the higher the standard. Although it is
usually the case that given the plentitude of moral disagreement one would find oneself in the
relevant context where such counterpossibilities were made relevant, it surely isn’t the case that one
always or even normally would. For consider the following case:
The Big Move: Riggins has recently moved to a community, SwingStateUSA, that
is very divided on the issue of the moral permissibility of homosexuality. While
Riggins believes that homosexuality is morally wrong, they are constantly met
with opposing views from others in their community. After several months of
heated debates, Riggins decides to move to a community that has similar beliefs.
Riggins moves to a community, RedStateUSA, where everyone believes that
homosexuality is morally wrong. In this very isolated community, Riggins never
faces disagreement from others about their beliefs about homosexuality. Riggins’
only reasons for believing that homosexuality is morally wrong both before and
after the move have not changed (for example, they are that their religious leaders
have said so).
This contextualist picture is problematic because it would conclude that Riggins’ belief that
homosexuality is morally wrong is signi icantly more justified when they move to RedStateUSA
than when they lived in SwingStateUSA. In fact, depending on the precise view, some of these
contextualist views may even conclude that Riggins’ belief is epistemically justified while they are in
RedStateUSA, while epistemically unjustified while they are in SwingStateUSA: for so long as one
just presently isn’t in a context where there is moral disagreement—where the possibility of not-p is
made relevant—then one is justified in holding the moral beliefs one does, since no alternatives are
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made relevant.48 The problem is that we do not think that Riggins’ belief comes to be justified--or is
any better epistemically--just because they no longer face any disagreement. Riggins shouldn’t be
able to increase the epistemic status of their belief just by moving to a less confrontational
community. Since Riggins’ evidence or reasons for believing that homosexuality is wrong haven’t
improved (as they haven’t changed at all), their beliefs shouldn’t suddenly acquire a better epistemic
status.49 The agent isolated from others with conflicting moral beliefs doesn’t have a (significantly
more) justified belief just because they are lucky enough to find themselves in circumstances where
there is no disagreement.50
At this point, the disagreement RA contextualist may say that the moral disagreement is still
salient when Riggins moves to RedStateUSA because, for example, Riggins would still remember
such disagreements, and so they would still be at their attention. But, if the moving situation had
been reversed such that Riggins moved from the isolated community to the divided community, the
same would hold, only in reverse: Riggins’ belief would have become significantly less justified after
they moved, and Riggins’ belief would have been significantly more justified (or even outright
justified) before they moved, which is still counterintuitive.51 Moreover, if one is to insist that the
disagreement present in one context follow agents into other contexts, the question arises of

Strictly speaking, this contextualist would say that for anyone in Riggins’s context of RedStateUSA, the utterance
“Riggins’s belief is justified” is true.
49
This general shiftiness of certain models of contextualism where an agent can go from knowing to not knowing and
back again without a change in their evidence has been objected to by Kompa (2002). Technically, the issue is that an
agent like Riggins would be able to truly say something like “Had I said ‘I know that p’ in SwingStateUSA I would have
spoken falsely, but now I do know that p” (see p. 15).
50
A Lewisian RA Contextualist may resist here, claiming that there are other features that determine relevancy,
specifically ones that would entail safety, and clearly Riggins’ beliefs wouldn’t be safe in The Big Move. However, since
moral truths are commonly accepted as necessary truths, these modal epistemic conditions like safety wouldn’t do any
work here for allowing the disagreement RA contextualist to resist the case.
51
To be clear, my argument here against the disagreement model of RA contextualism isn’t laying claim to the position
that standards aren’t shifty--that they don’t or can’t ever vary between contexts--but rather that this specific model has
standards shift in counterintuitive ways.
48
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whether we want contexts to be sticky in this way in general. For insisting on this comes at a cost of
losing the flexibility of the contextualist view, its prime advantage.
Since the disagreement model of RA contextualism has proven to be an inadequate
theoretical account of the difference in the standard of justification between moral and non-moral
beliefs, we should now turn to SSI to see whether it can provide a better account.52
3.2. SSI and Practical Interests
Recall that SSI holds that whether or not one is epistemically justified is a matter of meeting
a certain epistemic standard which is fixed by the subject’s practical interests.53 So, if we are to use
SSI as an analysis of how it is that the epistemic standards of justification is higher for moral beliefs
than for other, non-moral, beliefs, we would also have to say that there is more at stake practically
speaking in the case of moral beliefs—that it would be very bad, practically speaking, for us to have
false moral beliefs—than in the case of other kinds of beliefs.
Is this a plausible account of the differences in the standard of justification between moral
and other non-moral beliefs? I believe that it is. The heightened practical import of moral beliefs is
clear when we consider that morality is concerned with how we live our practical lives (e.g. our well
being and what we owe to others). Moreover, the practical dimension of morality concerns not just
how I, as a single agent, live, but how I live with and amongst others: our moral decisions and
actions not only affect ourselves but also others, and our relationships with others. This is because
moral beliefs also typically motivate one to act accordingly: holding a moral belief usually results in

Of course, I have here only considered one variation of the RA model of contextualism, and so don’t take myself to
have ruled out every possible RA model for moral beliefs. In section 3.3. I consider an alternative model of the RA view
that picks out practical interests as the phenomena that functions to raise the standard, which I argue fares quite well.
53
Particularly, it is the the subject of the attribution’s practical interests that are relevant. Certain problems arise with
this strict formulation of SSI, which I address in section 4.
52
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action that reflects one’s belief.54 Moreover, the reactive attitudes characteristic of morality as
expressions of holding others morally responsible that agents take up towards one another affect
agents practically, as it affects how they feel and what they choose to do or not do, as well as
(obviously) how others treat them.55 And, lastly, the matter and abundance of moral disagreement is
relevant in so far as the actions that result from holding certain moral beliefs affect those with
whom we disagree.56
If being epistemically justified in believing that p is a matter of being rational in acting as if
p, we can see how moral beliefs in general require us to meet higher epistemic standards than
non-moral beliefs: due to the breadth and depth to which our moral beliefs have practical import,
much is practically at stake in holding a moral belief.57

58

SSI can readily explain how it is that

holding a moral belief in general, and in virtue of it being a moral belief, requires a greater amount of
justification than other beliefs typically do. Again, this is because: (1) moral beliefs typically
motivate, (2) the content of moral beliefs typically has practical import, i.e. morality is about how to

That is, for example, that if one believes that φ-ing is morally obligatory one has some motivation to φ. It is important
to note here that I am not committing myself to a view concerning motivational internalism: I’m solely holding that
moral beliefs typically motivate, not that they necessarily do so all time, or all the time for rational agents. There is an
empirical question here concerning the claim that I am making, but it can be set aside since I don’t hold that the
standard of justification solely depends upon this claim being true; rather, it is one (plausible) feature amongst four
others that I list that account for the heightened practical stakes of moral beliefs generally. In fact, provided that we
accept Fantl and McGrath’s principle stated beforehand, a belief need not actually result in action in order for it to have
heightened practical import (since we’d only need to consider what’s practically at stake in acting or preferring as if p).
55
See Strawson (2003). To clarify: reactive attitudes make it the case that moral beliefs typically have higher practical
stakes because they (the reactive attitudes) apply to moral agents who commit moral actions, and so would count as
what’s partly at stake in acting as if p (or preferring as if p) or as one of the potential costs of being wrong about p,
where p is a moral proposition.
56
I’m imagining here that those who we disagree with would especially raise the practical stakes as compared to those
with whom we agree, since they would prefer that we not act as if our moral belief were true.
57
Driver (2006) also points out the practical import of moral beliefs (or, as she calls it, the “seriousness” of moral beliefs)
when arguing that it, when combined with epistemic worries about identifying moral experts, yield a justification of our
reluctance to accept moral testimony.
58
Again, this is not to say that there are no moral beliefs that are seemingly low-stakes, but rather that the moral
questions that we focus on and that are traditional moral questions are high-stakes. I address how an SSI theorist may
handle seemingly low-stakes moral beliefs later in this section.
54
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live, especially with one another, and so (3) moral beliefs’ practical import concerns acting in a way
that affects our own and others’ practical lives (4) moral beliefs make one vulnerable to reactive
attitudes, which affect how one feels, what one does, and how others treat you, and (5) they affect
others with whom we disagree.59
To clarify how this account would work, consider some examples. Take, for instance, the
belief that eating meat is morally permissible. One can see that this belief has a high practical import
in terms of how one lives one’s everyday life, how others’ lives go for them (granting that animals
are of a morally significant standing, or, alternatively, that the meat industry has a high negative
impact on the environment and so also our lives), and our choices of whether to eat meat or not
affects those with whom we disagree and make us vulnerable to reactive attitudes. So, on this
account, the standard of justification for this belief would be rather high due to it having these
features.
However, one may think that the standard of justification is rather low for beliefs of
wrongness when compared to beliefs of permissibility. In assessing whether the standard should be
high or not, one might say that we ought to think in terms of how Stanley conceives of it as a
matter of the costs of being wrong. The costs of being wrong about a belief of moral wrongness
may not be so bad, since a belief that something was wrong would, hopefully, keep one from doing
possibly bad things: if one were wrong about ϕ-ing being wrong such that ϕ-ing were permissible,
one wouldn’t be doing anything wrong by abstaining from ϕ-ing.
Yet, it’s easy to see that this surely isn’t true of all, or most, beliefs about moral wrongness.
For one, this objection would fail in cases where instead of ϕ-ing in fact being morally permissible it
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To be clear: I am not claiming that these are non-evidential features are exclusive to morality.
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were instead morally obligatory. One must consider not only the possibility that ϕ-ing is actually
morally permissible but also the possibility that ϕ-ing is morally obligatory in considering the costs
of being wrong about one’s belief of moral wrongness. In the case where ϕ-ing were actually
morally obligatory the cost of being wrong in one’s belief that ϕ-ing is morally wrong would be
quite high, since, by failing to ϕ, one would be doing something morally wrong.
It is also not the case that the standard of justification for all beliefs of moral wrongness is
lower than beliefs of permissibility or obligation even if we were just to consider cases where the
only reasonable possibilities were either that ϕ-ing is wrong or ϕ-ing is permissible. The case of
abortion serves as a nice example of why this is not the case: supposing that abortion is in fact
morally permissible, one can see how the costs of being wrong about abortion being morally wrong
are actually quite high, since it would plausibly result in taking actions that would keep oneself and
others from doing something that drastically affects the way their life goes for them.
Even if one accepts that beliefs of moral wrongness do not as such have a low(er) standard
of justification one may still think that the SSI account that I have laid out gives the wrong verdict
in cases of obvious moral beliefs, such as the belief that torturing innocent others for fun is wrong.
Intuitively, we think that one actually doesn’t need a lot, epistemically speaking, to be justified in
holding this belief. Yet, as a moral belief, my account seems to give the verdict that in this case the
standard of justification should still be high given the fact that it is a moral belief. However, my
account can not only accommodate but also explain this judgment.
To see this, we ought to return to Stanley’s full account of SSI. According to his view, a
subject, x, knows that p at a time t and a world w if and only if:
(1) p is true at w (2) ~p is not a serious epistemic possibility for x at t (3) If p
is a serious practical question for x at t, then ~p has a sufficiently low
epistemic probability, given x’s total evidence (4) x believes at t that p on the
44

basis of non-inferential evidence, or believes that p on the basis of a
competent inference from propositions that are known by x at t.60
To understand this account, we should first consider what make a proposition a “serious practical
question.” The general thought is as follows: an agent has a number of actions that they could take;
an agent will then order these actions according to what they would prefer to do, but conditional on
certain things being the case. For example, if it’s raining outside I would prefer to take the umbrella
because I would like to stay dry, but if it’s not raining I would prefer to leave the umbrella at home
since I would like to carry as little as possible. A proposition is a “serious practical question,” then,
just in case its being true or false would have more than a minimal or insignificant effect on the
preference ordering of the actions at the agent’s disposal. In this particular case, we can assume that
whether torturing innocent others for fun is wrong or not (i.e. permissible or even obligatory) is a
serious practical question.61 Although Stanley doesn’t say much to elucidate the concept of a serious
epistemic possibility,62 it seems that the possibility that it is not the case that torturing innocent
others for fun is wrong--that it’s either permissible or obligatory to torture innocent others for
fun--is quite slim.63 Given this, the proposition in question--that torturing innocent others for fun
is wrong--would meet condition (2) (and so also (3)). Since the negation of the proposition is not a
serious epistemic possibility, the epistemic standard would not be raised, and so would be quite low
given this great improbability.

Stanley (2005) pp. 89-90.
It seems that we can also utilize the notion of a serious practical question to explain another type of moral question:
theoretical moral questions like which first-order moral theory is correct (e.g. Utilitarianism or Kantianism). We could
do so by considering whether and the extent to which the answer to the question being true or false would affect the
preference ordering of the possible actions available to the agent to determine the standard. It seems that this type of
moral questions could very well have high standards, as they very well could affect which actions individuals decide to
take (e.g. whether to lie or break promises).
62
He states simply that there is a “vague though relatively situation-invariant level of objective probability” and that a
probability of 50% or more are definitely cases of serious epistemic possibility. See p. 91.
63
Although I haven’t given an account of how evidence supports moral beliefs, I say that this possibility seems to be
quite slim because it is forbidden on any plausible moral theory.
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One way object that identifying the standards-raising feature for moral beliefs as practical
interests or stakes would not be sufficient to account for the asymmetry between moral and
non-moral beliefs, or the way in which moral beliefs typically have a higher epistemic standard than
non-moral beliefs. For, one might say, non-moral beliefs can likewise have high practical stakes.
Importantly, though, even though the feature that SSI appeals to in accounting for the mechanism
which raises epistemic standards for moral beliefs can aso in principle be had by non-moral beliefs,
it can still explain the asymmetry in standards between typical moral and non-moral beliefs. This is
because, remember, the constraint for adequacy is not that the account must locate a feature that is
only had by moral beliefs. Interestingly, though, although non-moral beliefs can also in principle
have some of the practically-relevant features of moral beliefs just cited, there is one feature that is
still particular to the moral domain: reactive attitudes. So, while on this SSI account some
non-moral beliefs may also have high practical stakes, the typical moral belief will have greater
practical stakes than the typical non-moral belief, due to features of morality as a subject-matter that
are either typically had to a greater extent or exclusively for moral beliefs and actions based on
them. Since these practical upshots are special to moral beliefs, non-moral beliefs would not
typically have these, and so their standards would typically be lower.
As we’ve just seen, this account is advantageous in so far as it is able to generate the right
judgments on a series of types of cases. The previous case shows why, although the standard for
moral beliefs will be a high epistemic standard, not every single moral belief will have a high
epistemic standard. However, in so far as moral beliefs typically have these five features to a high
degree due to their moral content, and that SSI would acknowledge those features as relevant to
fixing the standard of epistemic justification, then it’s the case that the standard of justification for
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moral beliefs is typically high, and high due to the fact that it’s a moral belief. For these reasons, SSI
seems like a promising account of the higher epistemic standard of moral beliefs.
But are there any additional accounts of the higher standard? If having practical interests
function to fix the epistemic standard is a successful approach, a question remains whether the
contextualist can also adopt this strategy. I will consider this strategy in the next section.
3.3. Contextualism Redux
An alternative version of RA contextualism has recently been advanced which situates
practical interests as that which determines whether an alternative is relevant.64 More specifically, if
an alternative is important given the utterer’s practical interests or project(s), then it is relevant.
One of the advantages that this particular model of the RA contextualist view boasts of is its ability
to accommodate a variety of cases of knowledge ascriptions that proponents of SSI typically cite as
evidence in favor of their view over contextualism. Importantly, the view is able to achieve these
results because of its co-opting the same broad phenomena of practical interests that the SSI
theorist uses to fix epistemic standards. Since we have already seen that SSI is a promising
theoretical account of the higher standard of justification for moral beliefs, in assessing the strength
of this model of RA contextualism--interest-contextualism--we ought to determine whether or not
it would be able to adopt the same phenomena of moral beliefs as the SSI theorist does in accounting
for the higher epistemic standard of moral beliefs.
It seems quite straightforward that the interest-contextualist can do this. That is, it seems
that the interest-contextualist can also adopt the five features of moral beliefs cited to explain the
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See McKenna (2013) and (2011).
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higher epistemic standard--that moral beliefs typically motivate, that the content of moral beliefs
typically has practical import, i.e. morality is about how to live, especially with one another, and so
moral beliefs’ practical import concerns acting in a way that affects our own and others’ practical
lives, that moral beliefs make one vulnerable to the reactive attitudes, which affect how one feels,
what one does, and how others treat you, and that they affect others with whom we disagree--that
the SSI theorist does in accounting for the higher epistemic standard of moral beliefs. Importantly,
unlike the disagreement model of RA contextualism, the interest-contextualist seems to sidestep
extensional worries by locating a phenomenon connected to features of morality as a subject matter,
thus being able to hold that moral beliefs in general require us to meet higher epistemic standards
than other beliefs due to the fact that it is a moral belief.

4. Whose Interests?
4.1. The Problem of Apathy
Although I have said that both SSI and interest-contextualism are promising accounts of the
higher epistemic standard of moral beliefs, each view requires a closer look at its exact mechanics.
For while each view stipulates that practical interests or stakes determine the stringency of the
epsitemic standard, one large question looms: whose practical interests are relevant in fixing the
standard?
This question is extremely important for our analysis for two reasons: (1) one main
difference between each view is precisely who or which context the standard is fixed relative to, and
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(2) it’s imperative that each view not face the kind of extensional problems that the disagreement
model of RA contextualism did by fixing the standard relative to the wrong agent or agents’
interests. A problem seems to arise along (2) for each view as they currently stand by paying closer
attention to (1). The issue is that each view, while both being able to feature practical interests or
stakes in their view, strictly speaking fix epistemic standards relative to a particular person or
context. This means that for each view, strictly speaking it’s not just that practical interests are
factored into the theory, but that a particular person’s practical interests are factored into the
theory, and fix the epistemic standard. For the contextualist, this would be the practical interests or
stakes of the context of utterance or attributor, while for the SSI it would be those of the subject of
the knowledge/belief attribution. The problem with respect to (2) arises when the respective
agent--whether the subject or attributor of the knowledge/belief attribution--happens to be a kind
of amoralist, and just have absolutely no interests in morality and its practical upshots. For it seems
that, as these views are currently formulated in the literature, the fact that the relevant agent just
doesn’t have anything practically at stake herself in holding the moral beliefs that she does makes
moral knowledge too easy for them, or those their utterances are about, to come by. Moreover, the
ways in which these views are currently formulated would fail to explain the asymmetry in
justification in the initial pairs of cases if we were to conceive of Riggins as such an amoralist:
according to SSI, Amoralist Riggins has no additional particular moral interests, and so would be
just as justified in their moral belief as their non-moral belief; likewise, for the Contextualist: this
problem would arise for those knowledge- or justification-ascribing utterances that amoralists
would make of Riggins in the initial pairs of cases. It seems that serious problems arise for these
views, as standardly formulated, precisely because their focus on interests is too narrow. The
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problem, really, is that it’s not just any one individual’s interests in morality that makes morality
have high practical stakes, and so the epistemic standard of justification shouldn’t vary so easily with
any one individual.65
As damning as this may seem to each view, I believe that each deserves further attention
before we throw in the towel. In what remains of this paper, I will argue that while SSI has
something that can be said on its behalf to appease this worry, the interest-contextualist view can be
amended to accommodate this worry quite well, and so in the end is the more promising view.
4.2. All Non-Isolated Subjects
There are two ways the SSI theorist could accommodate the extensional worry that moral
knowledge would be too easy to come by for amoralist subjects who just don’t care about morality.
One way would be to adjust the interests that epistemic standards are fixed relative to. Another way
would be to challenge the assumption that because the subject doesn’t care about doing the right
thing or being moral, they have no practical interests that attach to their having the moral beliefs
that they do. In these ways, the SSI theorist could maintain that even in these amoralist cases the
epistemic standard is comparatively high for moral beliefs.
Take the first option. One straightforward way to escape this extensional worry would be
say that it’s not just the subject’s interests that fix the epistemic standard, but also others’ interests.66

As I note, McKenna (2013) puts forth a contextualist view that takes multiple agents’ interests as relevant for fixing
the standard. Likewise, Pace (2011) puts forth a kind of SSI that he calls “the moral encroachment theory of
justification,” which holds that epistemic standards (for all kinds of beliefs, not just moral ones) are affected by the
preferences a subject morally should have. However, as I argue, what’s important here is not just that the view is able to
take into account multiple agents’ interests, nor the interests that any one agent should have, but the interests of all
those agents relevant for morality itself.
66
I’m grateful to Hille Paakkunainen for bringing this SSI theorist option to my attention.
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In this way, even if it is the amoralist’s belief that’s under evaluation, we would still think that
there’s much at stake in holding the belief--it’s just that the costs of being wrong would concern the
costs to these other's interests, instead of just the costs to the amoralist’s interests. Since, then, for
any typical moral proposition many agents would have serious interests involved, the epistemic
standard would still typically be quite high.67
Although this strategy has the advantage of being a very direct and straightforward way for
the SSI theorist to accommodate the amoralist, it also seems to face some disadvantages. The first,
and perhaps most obvious, is that it’s perplexing why another agent’s interests would affect whether
a subject knows or is justified in believing. That is, it seems quite counterintuitive to say, for
example, that your interest in staying dry should affect whether I’m epistemically justified in
believing that it’s not going to rain (that is, why it would determine how low the probability of it
going to rain needs to be for me, or whether I’m rational in acting as if it’s not going to rain), when
I have no interests myself in staying dry.
Relatedly, it seems that although traditional SSI (which holds that it’s just the subject’s
interests that determine the epistemic standard) has a theoretical explanation for why it’s the
subject’s interests that determine the epistemic standard, there does not seem to be a similar
explanation for why other’s interests are included on this amended version of SSI.68 Although both

Although one initial thought may be that this proposed view is no longer a version of SSI (since the truth of
knowledge ascriptions would no longer be relative to the subject’s interests), I believe this worry can be set aside, and is
not central to the issue at hand. Rather, I aim to raise issues to this account, whether it be called SSI or something else.
Moreover, the second revisionary option I outline is consistent with this strict way of understanding SSI, so if the
reader does not find this first strategy to be available to the SSI theorist, they may read ahead to consider the second
option.
68
Of course, contextualists have motivated an explanation of ‘epistemic gatekeeping’ for why it’s the attributor’s
interests that determine the epistemic standard. See Henderson (2009). However, unlike contextualism the proposal
here doesn’t hold that it’s just the attributor, but rather others in general in addition to the subject. Additionally, this
67
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Stanley and Fantl & McGrath seem to assume a kind of decision-theoretic framework in motivating
their respective SSI views (wherein agents rationally ought to do that which would maximize good
consequences for them), I believe that there is an additional explanation the SSI theorist can give for
why it is the subject’s preferences that determine what’s rational for her to do, and so the subject’s
interests that are relevant for determining the epistemic standard. According to this, what explains
that it is the subject’s interests that are relevant is that the hypothetical imperative is a (generally
uncontroversial) rule of rationality: it says that in order to be rational, an agent ought to take the
(best) means to their ends.69 In this way, acting as if p, when p’s being false is a serious possibility,
and where if p were false it would cost one a lot, would be a bad way to achieve one’s ends. In
general, taking on large risks is not a good way to achieve one’s ends, and so is irrational; it only
seems rational if one is very sure that the risk is going to turn out in one’s favor. This, though, is
just what SSI holds: when the costs of being wrong are high, an agent needs a lot of evidence to rule
out the possibility of not-p being true. Importantly, the hypothetical imperative does not say that in
order to be rational an agent ought to take the best means to other’s ends.70 In this way, it would be
quite controversial to hold that it is a rule of rationality to take into account others’ interests. So,
this amended SSI that holds that it’s not just the subject’s interests that determine the epistemic
standard seems to have some explanatory disadvantages.

approach seems to be distinct from contextualism as it is still not a semantic thesis about epistemic terms, holding that
the same proposition is expressed across contexts of use.
69
I say ‘generally uncontroversial’ since some hold that there are additional rules of rationality, like the categorical
imperative, which are quite contentious as rules of rationality.
70
Interestingly, it seems that if this is the correct explanation the SSI theorist ought to appeal to--namely, rules of
rationality--then the Kantian, who holds that the categorical imperative is a rule of rationality, has the same principled
reasoning to explain why it is other’s interests (and not just the subject’s) that determine what it’s rational to do, and so
the epistemic standard. Unfortunately, this proposal is outside the scope of the current paper, but I flag it here for
further development.

52

The second way the SSI theorist could revise their theory, remember, would be to challenge
the assumption that if the subject is an amoralist, they have no practical interests in such moral
beliefs. For example, one may take up a non-subjectivist theory of well-being.71 Additionally, the
SSI theorist could do this by looking at those practical features of morality initially picked out and
cited as what raises the epistemic standard for moral beliefs. One thing that could be said is that
whatever the subject’s particular cares about being moral, they would at least always be one of the
agents who is made vulnerable to such reactive attitudes by holding a moral belief. Provided that the
agent cares not to be the subject of such unpleasant attitudes as indignation and resentment, she has
a practical stake in coming to have the right moral beliefs. In general, it seems that provided that
this agent is not completely isolated, the fact that she personally doesn’t care about morality doesn’t
make the fact that others care about her moral beliefs irrelevant: for these others could either help
or hurt her ability to achieve the ends of her own personal non-moral projects. In these ways, even
if the subject doesn’t care about morality, provided that they are not totally isolated from others the
SSI theorist could still say that they have significant stakes in their moral beliefs. At the same time,
though, this understanding of how others’ interests are relevant for fixing the standard is still
subject to a kind of contingency that some may find objectionable, for this account does not
guarantee that every moral context would generate a higher epistemic standard. Although on this
way of absolving the initial extensional worry SSI still strictly speaking holds that it is just one
individual’s interests that are relevant for fixing the epistemic standard, they are able to maintain
that the epistemic standard would be high even for even for most of those individuals who are
apathetic to morality, and high due to features of morality as a subject matter. Overall, while SSI is
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I’m grateful to David Sobel for bringing this option to my attention.
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still a promising account of the higher epistemic standard of moral beliefs, it does raise some
worries.
4.3. Moral Contexts
One thing to note about interest-contextualism is that it can in principle select for more
than just the utterer’s interests when selecting for the interests that function to make alternatives
relevant. Although as a contextualist the interest-contextualist must hold that the standard is fixed
relative to the context of utterance, exactly what the context of utterance selects for and how are
open questions. More specifically, interest-contextualist views can be analyzed across two
dimensions: (a) the means by which the context of utterance selects for certain interests, and (b)
whose interests are selected.72
On a simple interest-contextualist view, the answer to (a) would be whoever is making the
knowledge attribution, and (b) would be the current speaker’s interests. However, as we’ve seen,
this is not a good account of the higher epistemic standard of moral beliefs. A more complex
interest-contextualist can, however, incorporate additional agents’ interests such that the interests
selected for are those of a group. The interest-contextualist can do this by stipulating that with
respect to (a), the context of utterance selects for the interests relevant or attached to the project or
question that’s salient in the context of utterance. So, for example, if the project that’s salient in the
context of utterance is seeing the Cavs game tonight, and the utterance is “I know the game starts at
6,” the interests selected are those that agents attach to the project (e.g. your and my interests in

One can think of these dimensions as mirroring the character and content dimensions of demonstratives. See Kaplan
(1989).
72
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seeing the game). Under this variation of interest-contextualism, the greater the group’s interests in
the contextually salient project, the higher the standard.73
But the interest-contextualist does not need to settle for even this expansion of interests.
One interesting option available to the contextualist is to point to the kind of context one is in
when making ascriptions of the epistemic status of moral beliefs: specifically, it is a moral context.
Along this line, the interest-contextualist could claim that given the moral context, a particular
project or question is immediately made salient, namely the moral status of some action (e.g. that
φ-ing is morally permissible).74 In this case, in response to (a) the context would select for the
interests of those that are relevant for settling this moral question and general questions in the
moral domain. For (b) the interest-contextualist can say a number of things, but will ultimately
depend upon their first order moral theory. This is because whose interests are relevant in moral
contexts is a question about which agents or beings are relevant for settling moral questions, or the
subject of moral obligations, which is just the question that first-order moral theories concern
themselves with as theories of value and obligation.
To see this, consider some examples. A consequentialist who takes happiness as of primary
value takes all beings that are capable of experiencing that value, namely sentient beings, as the
beings which are relevant for settling moral questions like what is right and wrong to do. Given
this, a consequentialist would say for (b) that it is the interests of all sentient creatures. For a
Kantian who held that it is rationality, or the ability to set and pursue ends, that is of ultimate value,
the beings which are relevant for settling moral questions will be those who have this rational

See McKenna (2013) for this view.
This feature would make the view a kind of flexible contextualism. See Dowell (2013) and (2011) for flexible
contextualist accounts of both deontic and epistemic modals respectively.
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capacity. Consequently, for (b) the Kantian would hold that it is the interests of rational agents. One
interesting upshot of this account is that moral epistemology is strongly tied to first-order moral
theory, as how high the standard is set is ultimately a function of which beings are taken as morally
relevant.
In the end, this interest-contextualism variation seems extremely promising, for not only
would it be able to explain why the epistemic standard is higher for moral beliefs and avoid
extensional worries, but it would be able to say that the higher epistemic standard is due to features
of morality as a subject matter.75 As it faces less problems than the aforementioned variations of SSI,
it is the more promising view.

5. Conclusion
Many have noted an apparent asymmetry between moral and non-moral beliefs in several
epistemic domains, like testimony, disagreement, and expertise, wherein it seems harder for moral
beliefs to achieve the same kind of epistemic value or credit (justification, knowledge), that
non-moral beliefs seem to easily achieve in these domains. The only unifying account of this
asymmetry across these domains, and perhaps the most intuitively plausible explanation of them, is
that moral beliefs typically have a higher epistemic standard. However, even if we were to adopt
this explanation of the asymmetry, one large question remains: what functions to make the
epistemic standard higher for moral beliefs?
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I’m grateful to Janice Dowell for bringing this contextualist option to my attention.
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In this paper I’ve addressed just this question, searching for a theoretical account of the
higher epistemic standard for moral beliefs. In the end, I’ve put forth two promising theoretical
accounts of the higher epistemic standard of moral beliefs. After identifying several key practical
features of morality, I’ve argued that what is vital to providing such an account is having the
practical interests tied to these features play a crucial role in fixing the epistemic standard. This
being said, I’ve shown that there are variations of both SSI and contextualism which can make these
moral practical interests central to their views, arguing that there is one particular kind of
contextualist view that is the most promising. The views put forth are quite promising in their
ability to explain the higher epistemic standard of moral beliefs, attribute the higher standard to
features of morality as a subject matter, and meet extensional worries.
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Chapter 3
“Constructivism’s Own Epistemology”

0. Introduction
Generally speaking, moral epistemology revolves around a realist metaethics. This may
seem obvious: after all, it is the realist who holds that there are moral facts, and so also the glimmer
of hope of moral knowledge. Indeed, how we could ever come to have moral knowledge has been a
concern for all realists, as one’s moral epistemology has been a prime site of objections to realist
views, both naturalist and non-naturalist alike.76 For example, a non-skeptical moral epistemology
has been thought of as problematic for non-naturalists who hold not only that the moral facts are
mind-independent, but that they concern properties that are not natural: for how could we possibly
come to epistemically grasp these facts if moral properties aren’t causal?
One metaethical position that has oddly received little attention from moral epistemologists,
and the one that will be of focus here, is constructivism. One reason it has received little attention is
because it, like other mind-dependent views, seems to avoid epistemic problems that the realist
doesn’t. This, in fact, is one of the most attractive features of the view: given its account of the
nature of moral facts, knowledge of them seems both readily attainable and straightforward. If,
though, the advantage mind-dependent views like constructivism have is epistemic, one needs to
have a moral epistemology on offer in order to make good on this enticing promise. In this paper, I
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See Joyce (2006), Street (2006), Tropman (2012).
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will consider the epistemic prospects of the constructivist. I will argue that the constructivist’s
traditional moral epistemology, Reflective Equilibrium, is not the best moral epistemology on offer
for them. But, this should not dissuade one from constructivism, for I offer an alternative moral
epistemology that I argue avoids the specific issues of Reflective Equilibrium. Interestingly, on this
new model, moral epistemology is fundamentally social, in the sense that agents’ social
relations--namely, their interactions with other agents--directly determines the epistemic standing
of their moral beliefs.
The paper will proceed as follows: in section 1, I outline a broad characterization of
constructivism. In section 2, I survey the current favorite moral epistemology of constructivists,
Reflective Equilibrium, and the traditional issues it faces. Moreover, though, I argue that it faces an
unnoticed issue that should push constructivists towards a more fundamentally social moral
epistemology.77 In section 3 I provide such an alternative account, the Challenge-Response Model.
After offering a few variations of the model, I argue that it avoids the problems that plague
Reflective Equilibrium and offers a better account of how agents can come to have justified beliefs
of the moral facts as the constructivist conceives of them.

1. Constructivism and Epistemic Justification
Most generally, constructivism is defined as the view that holds that certain normative
truths are not independent of a certain process or procedure: rather, they are the result of such a

To be clear: my argument here is not that Reflective Equilibrium has insurmountable problems, and I do not take
myself to be giving a definitive argument against it. Rather, my claim is that there is an alternative, unexplored moral
epistemology on offer to the constructivist that should be more attractive to them, as it avoids the traditional problems
Reflective Equilibrium faces.
77
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process or procedure. More specifically, constructivism is often characterized as the view that holds
that certain normative truths are determined relative to what agents would decide on or agree to
under certain hypothetical choice situations. As a first order moral theory, the constructivist holds
that it is moral truths that are determined by this hypothetical choice scenario; as a metaethical
theory, the constructivist holds that it is all normative truths, including an agent’s reasons, that are
determined by such a hypothetical choice scenario.
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Of course, just how to characterize constructivism in ethics and metaethics is itself rife with
controversy.
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Sharon Street prefers an alternative characterization, arguing for a “practical
80

standpoint” characterization of constructivism over its proceduralist characterization. She holds
that constructivism is the view, broadly, that a certain set of normative judgments are true because
and only in so far as they withstand scrutiny from the standpoint of some other specified set of
81

normative judgments.

According to her, the difference between ethical (“restricted”) and

metaethical (“thoroughgoing”) constructivism is in the second the set of normative judgments: for
the ethical constructivist this is a particular subset of all of the agent's normative judgments,
whereas for the metaethical constructivist it is all of the agent’s normative judgments.
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For the purposes of this paper, I will be focusing on “restricted” constructivism--that is,
constructivism about moral facts only--and the more traditional proceduralist characterization.83

Here I am following Bagnoli (2014) in her initial characterization of constructivism in ethics and metaethics.
There is also the controversy of whether there is even a difference between ethical and metaethical constructivism, as
some hold that constructivism is not a legitimate metaethical view. I do not take up this issue here.
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Street (2010).
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Street (2008).
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Ibid.
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One reason I adopt the proceduralist characterization is that it is more commonplace, but, also, because the main
reason Street cites for re-conceiving of constructivism though the practical-standpoint characterization is because the
latter characterization solves certain issues with constructivism as a distinct metaethical position; since I am focusing on
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This view can generally be characterized as the view that certain moral truths are determined as the
outputs of a certain hypothetical choice procedure.84 This constructivist view of the nature of
morality opposes the realist by holding that the moral facts are not antecedently given to be
‘discovered’, but are rather the result of a certain procedure. At the same time, the view opposes the
relativist by maintaining a sense of objectivity: it holds that the moral facts are those that all relevant
rational agents would settle on or accept through the procedure.85
One notable constructivist view is Scanlon’s.86 According to his view, moral rightness and
wrongness and determined by principles of conduct adopted by agents given certain constraints on
their procedure of choice of the principles itself. Put more simply, an action is wrong if it violates a
principle of conduct that no one could reasonably reject. In this way, what we are ultimately seeking
is justifiability to others (more particularly, that our actions are justifiable to others on grounds they
could not reasonably reject). Importantly, the agents who must not reasonably reject the principles
which determine the moral status of our actions are also constrained: these aren’t just any agents,
but rather those who antecedently take certain things as reasons, specifically those who take there
to be reason to live with others on grounds that they couldn’t reasonably reject, and who are,
themselves, reasonable. In this way, the particular principles which determine the moral facts
(what’s right and what’s wrong) are selected through a choice procedure that’s constrained by (1)
who’s involved in the choosing (agents who take there to be reason to live with others and are

constructivism as an first-order ethical position, there’s no particular reason to adopt the practical standpoint
characterization.
84
I say “certain moral truths” because not all moral constructivists take themselves to be providing an account of all
moral truths, but rather a subset of them. For example, Scanlon (1998) takes himself to be providing an account of the
class of moral truths that concern “what we owe to each other”.
85
I say all relevant agents because, as we will see, the class of agents who are appropriate for conducting the procedure
typically picks out agents with certain normative commitments, and so differs amongst constructivist views.
86
Scanlon (1998).
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themselves reasonable) and (2) the basis of the choice of principles (they must be ones no one of (1)
could reasonably reject).
On this picture of what the moral facts are like, how do we come to be epistemically justified
in holding certain moral beliefs? This question is difficult and interesting for the moral
epistemologist for a few reasons. First, unlike subjectivist mind-dependent views, the moral facts
aren’t relative to an individual’s own moral outlook or point of view, and, as such, wouldn’t be
accessible by internal reflection. This is because the moral facts are determined by a certain group of
agents’ joint agreement or decision. Secondly, unlike conventionalist or relativist mind-dependent
views, the moral facts aren’t relative to any actual groups’ direct outlook or practical point of view,
and so wouldn’t be available by group data-gathering methods like censuses or polls (that is, we
could not just conglomerate individuals’ reports). This is because, remember, the moral facts are the
output of a certain constrained or idealized procedure run by a certain group of idealized agents, not
just the summation or average of a group of individual’s opinions. Lastly, unlike the realist, the
constructivist doesn’t think that the moral facts are robustly mind-independent, antecedently given
and therefore there to be discovered, but rather are the result of this hypothetical joint choice
procedure. Given this, realist accounts wherein we intuit or perceive the moral truth wouldn’t seem
to grant us the kind of access we need to these facts. But, at the same time, the constructivist does
think that there are moral facts that thus moral knowledge to be had.
One moral epistemology that is supposed to make knowledge of the moral facts and justified
moral beliefs given their constructivist characterization available is Reflective Equilibrium. In the
next section, I will argue that Reflective Equilibrium faces several significant issues, the most trying
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of which should leave the constructivist wanting for a different, more fundamentally social, moral
epistemology.

2. Reflective Equilibrium
Reflective Equilibrium is perhaps the most popular alternative to foundationalist moral
epistemologies. As such an alternative, Reflective Equilibrium rejects the foundationalist’s claim
that some moral beliefs are automatically justified, and therefore serve as the basis of justification
for other beliefs. Instead, Reflective Equilibrium holds that all moral beliefs are justified in virtue of
their standing or relation to other moral (and non-moral) beliefs, namely whether they cohere with
them. One of Reflective Equilibrium’s main advantages is its ability to avoid having to posit some
sort of special sense or faculty with which we can come to grasp these self-evident and directly
justified foundational beliefs, thus providing a simple epistemology for domains where we seem to
lack perceptual access to the facts. As a process, Reflective Equilibrium describes the way such
justification is gained, by working back and forth between our judgment or intuition on a particular
case and a principle that’s appealed to in support of the particular judgment. In this way, the
ultimate goal is stability through mutual revision of particular moral judgments or intuitions on
concrete cases and overarching moral principles until coherence is reached. Overall, then, Reflective
Equilibrium serves as both an account by which to assess whether moral beliefs are justified (when
coherency is reached), and as an outline for a process by which to come to have justified moral
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beliefs (work back and forth between revising your initial judgments and principles until coherency
is reached).87
There are two forms of Reflective Equilibrium: narrow and wide. On the narrow view, S is
justified in holding a moral belief p just in case p coheres with S’s other moral beliefs (q, r, s), where
the process is that of mutual revision of one’s particular moral judgments and the moral principles
one appeals to in making such judgments until coherency amongst all of the agent’s moral
judgments and principles is reached. On the wide view, S is justified in holding a moral belief p just
in case p coheres with not just the principles the agent endorses (q, r, s), but also with leading
alternative moral principles (x, y, z); the process, then, is that of mutual revision of one’s particular
moral judgments and the leading moral principles, including those that one does not antecedently
endorse, until coherency is reached amongst this wide set of beliefs.88
This model of epistemic justification is perhaps most widely endorsed by constructivists.89
The question remains, though, how Reflective Equilibrium would secure epistemic justification for
the constructivist. First, given the constructivist characterization of the moral facts, they are
non-perceptual, and so not available via perception. But, remember here that Reflective
Equilibrium has traditionally been hailed as an uncomplicated epistemology that gives us access to
facts that aren’t perceptually accessible. On this picture, we don’t need any special sense or faculty,
but can rather get in touch with the facts by using our powers of reflection and rational capacities to
resolve inconsistencies amongst our beliefs and bring them into coherence with one another. And,

Of course, there are controversies about how to cash out the details of the method of Reflective Equilibrium (see Cath
(2016)). I will not address these here, since my objections to the method are general.
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by using wide Reflective Equilibrium and considering alternative moral viewpoints, we thereby
come to partially represent the constructivist procedure that determines the moral facts itself.
Considering viewpoints that differ from our own and seeking agreement amongst them mimics the
way in which a multitude of agents with different starting values and moral points of view come to
agree on a set of moral principles, and thus could be said to reliably track them. So, Reflective
Equilibrium seems to provide a metaphysically uncomplicated and unmysterious procedure that
tracks the moral truth by resembling the hypothetical procedure that constructs it.
But one may wonder whether, although Reflective Equilibrium has been widely endorsed, it
really is the best epistemic methodology for the constructivist. For example, one may doubt that the
process itself would be able to serve as an adequately reliable guide to the moral truth. As a species
of a traditional objection against coherency accounts of justification, this objection argues that given
our initial starting points, mutual revision and coherency constraints can only bring us so far: if we
start with outlandish particular judgments and principles that run very far afield from the moral
truth it’s doubtful that merely seeking stability between these judgments will deliver us as far as we
need to go. Rather, it seems quite possible to have a set of moral beliefs that are in complete
coherence with one another, but yet where they are all false. Garbage in, garbage out.90
In a similar vein, one may object to the weight--small and initial though it may be--that’s
given to our initial judgments or intuitions: that is, that insofar as the goal of Reflective Equilibrium
is coherency, there’s some reason to bring the set of principles into coherence with one’s initial

See Klein and Warfield (1994) for an initial article on this objection. Kelly and McGrath (2010) pose a version of this
objection given an interpretation of what qualifies as an initial judgment, only in reverse: they argue that the problem
with Reflective Equilibrium is that one could fall too far from one’s initial starting point, i.e., that one could start with a
relatively on track or reasonable judgment but arrive at a judgment that is unreasonable by the end of the process.
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judgment. One may think that our initial unexamined intuitions should be granted no weight, given
that they are most likely the result and reflection of particular cultural upbringings and biases.
Given these reasons to doubt their epistemic credibility, simply bringing these judgments which
lack credibility into coherence with others doesn’t somehow suddenly make any of these beliefs
themselves credible. Rather, if these initial judgments or intuitions are corrupt, we shouldn’t seek to
cohere any of our other beliefs or principles--which may not be corrupt--to them. Rather, it seems
we’d be epistemically better off and closer to the truth giving these initial judgments or intuitions
no weight.91
Although these are all issues with Reflective Equilibrium that pertain to it as a species of a
coherentist account of justification, there is another issue that’s gone unnoticed that concerns the
constructivist’s endorsement of Reflective Equilibrium in particular. Remember here that one of the
issues that constructivists faced in securing epistemic justification is that internal reflection seemed
to be an unavailable epistemic procedure for getting in touch with the moral facts given the
constructivist’s commitments of the metaphysical basis of these facts: namely, that they aren’t
relative to an individual’s own outlook or moral point of view, but are rather determined by the
agreement of a certain group of hypothetical agents who have differing moral perspectives and
values. But, the methodology of Reflective Equilibrium just is internal reflection: individual agents
are to internally reflect on their own beliefs, inspecting them for inconsistencies and revising them

See Brandt (1979) and Hare (1973) for early versions of this objection. Some proponents of the view have since
argued that Reflective Equilibrium is best understood as holding that one’s initial set of beliefs are already somewhat
justified in light of this objection; however, this makes Reflective Equilibrium a kind of moderate foundationalism (see
Cath (2016)). My objections here concern the traditional understanding of Reflective Equilibrium as a coherentist
model of epistemic justification, and so I won’t consider this variation of the model here.
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to reach optimal coherency. The problem, to put it simply, is this: Reflective Equilibrium ignores
the social dimension of the metaphysical procedure and its epistemic importance.
Now, to be fair, Reflective Equilibrium does try to account for the social aspect of the
constructivist’s procedure in its wide version, where individual agents must bring their judgments
into coherence with not just their own but also alternative moral principles. However, we should
doubt whether considering alternative moral viewpoints that could possibly be upheld by others in
the way wide Reflective Equilibrium conceives of it adequately represents this social dimension of
the constructivist procedure, and thereby sufficiently puts agents in a position for their moral
beliefs to gain justification or knowledge.
One reason to doubt this is by considering whether representing others’ alternative moral
viewpoints from one’s own perspective is really an accurate way to capture these alternative
viewpoints. In general, it seems that one should worry that agents will be uncharitable,
unsympathetic or biased in these representations of alternative viewpoints given that one disagrees
with them, or that one will misrepresent them given one’s lack of understanding of that moral
perspective. But this concern goes beyond the issue of general human fallibility and finds deep roots
in non-ideal facts about the actual world.
Elizabeth Anderson has recently argued that this phenomenon of misrepresenting the moral
outlooks and perspectives of others is very real, especially in circumstances of power imbalances
between social groups. In her essay “The Social Epistemology of Morality: Learning from the
Forgotten History of the Abolition of Slavery,” she notes actual historical cases where groups
misunderstood and therefore misrepresented other groups’ conception and meaning of certain
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shared moral concepts.92 One example she focuses on is that of “freedom”. In her analysis, Anderson
explains that during emancipation whites and former slaves had very different understandings of
what freedom for former slaves meant and entailed. For whites, it meant opting in for wage labor
that produced surplus value and working long hours so as to maximize profit. However, former
slaves conceptualized what it was to be free quite differently: they prioritized self-direction and
self-government wherein one could decide for oneself how long and hard one worked, and to what
end, where the end valued most was typically subsistence that allowed for leisure time over profit.
Given this difference in conceptualization of freedom and its value, most whites concluded that
former slaves were lazy and didn’t properly understand or value freedom.93
This actual case of misrepresenting others’ moral outlooks should cast serious doubt on
actual agents’ general abilities to accurately represent alternative moral outlooks. This is especially
true when determining the epistemic status of actual agents’ moral beliefs, since it is in the actual
non-ideal world that social hierarchies exist. As Anderson notes, her examination of these cases
show that “power makes people morally blind. It stunts their moral imagination . . .”.94
Insofar as wide Reflective Equilibrium falsely assumes agents’ abilities to accurately
represent alternative moral viewpoints, it’s a faulty method for agents to secure epistemic
justification. The exact way in which it is faulty depends on whether or not Reflective Equilibrium
requires the agent’s representation of alternative leading moral principles needs to be accurate or
not. If there is no accuracy constraint on the alternative moral principles the agent is representing,
then the method of Reflective Equilibrium is too weak: it would be the case that the agent could

Anderson (2016).
Ibid., pp. 11-12.
94
Ibid., p.15.
92
93

68

successfully complete the process, reaching a state of equilibrium between her initial starting beliefs
and these alternative principles, but yet the beliefs that she ends up with would intuitively lack
justification. Alternatively, the proponent of Reflective Equilibrium might want to embrace an
accuracy constraint on the representation of the alternative principles so as to avoid this issue of
generating false positive judgments of justification. If so, though, the process does not even get off
the ground: for, given the lesson learned from Anderson’s work, agents will be hard pressed to
accurately represent others’ moral viewpoints, nevertheless bring their own beliefs into equilibrium
with them. Either way, then, Reflective Equilibrium faces significant issues in securing epistemic
justification for the constructivist.
Given the general problems Reflective Equilibrium faces as an account of epistemic
justification for moral beliefs, and the particular issue it faces in securing epistemic justification for
the constructivist, it seems as though the constructivist has failed to secure one of its biggest
strengths: namely, a straightforward and uncomplicated moral epistemology. But, constructivism
shouldn’t be abandoned yet, provided that there is an alternative moral epistemology on offer to the
constructivist that avoids the problems Reflective Equilibrium faces and better secures the promise
of epistemic justification. One lesson to draw from the issue Anderson shows with representing
others’ moral viewpoints is that the best way to get an accurate representation of these viewpoints is
to go straight to the source: to have those who actually take up those alternative viewpoints
represent their position themselves. With regards to building an account of epistemic justification
for the constructivist, this would amount to building in a criteria of engaging with actual others
who have moral viewpoints which differ from one’s own. In the next section, I will provide such an
alternative account for the constructivist that takes this dimension of social engagement as
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foundational for securing epistemic justification for moral beliefs, and thus, I will argue, better
secures epistemic justification for the constructivist.95

3. Constructivism’s Own Epistemology: The Challenge-Response Model
3.1. Overview
If one were to survey views of epistemic justification one likely wouldn’t come across the
Challenge-Response model. Introduced in 1971 by Carl Wellman, the view has unfortunately
dropped out of conversations in epistemology regarding justification. Although it may be debatable
how promising it is as an account of epistemic justification in general, I will argue that it is a
promising account of epistemic justification for moral beliefs in particular, given the constructivist’s
moral metaphysics.
Very generally, the view holds that what determines whether an agent has an epistemically
justified belief depends on whether they can adequately respond to or meet challenges or objections
made to their belief by others. According to Wellman, challenges are claims that are taken to be
threatening or upsetting by the agent to her belief, and are “necessarily directed at someone on
some occasion . . . [and so are] relative to the person for whom it is a challenge and the occasion on
which it is a challenge”.96 Wellman characterizes responses as claims that would reassure and thus
be accepted by the person who issued the challenge; a response is adequate just in case anyone who

Again, to be clear, my claim is not that I have provided a thorough refutation of Reflective Equilibrium, or that
epistemic justification is made impossible on Reflective Equilibrium, but rather that it faces serious issues and should
leave us wanting for a better account that circumvents these problems. In what follows, my claim is that the alternative
account I provide, the Challenge-Response Model, is a better epistemology for the constructivist.
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understood both the challenge and response and is thinking rationally would withhold the
challenge.97 Although Wellman puts forth his particular Challenge-Response model as a model of
epistemic justification for moral beliefs, David Annis also put forth a version of a
Challenge-Response model, but for epistemic justification in general. On his particular model, an
agent has an epistemically justified belief just in case they are able to meet certain objections, where
these objects are relative to and determined by certain epistemic goals. Objections must be
expressions of real doubt issued by a certain objector-group on an actual occasion, which is
determined by the epistemic goals in the context.98 In order to adequately meet an objection, the
agent must respond in a way that the members of the objector group withdraw their original claim
as a challenge (that is, they no longer maintain their expression of doubt regarding the agent’s
belief).
Overall, the view can be characterized as a kind of social contextualism. It is a kind of
contextualism because the challenges or objections that an agent needs to respond to aren’t
invariant but rather relative to particular contexts. It is social because whether or not one’s belief
comes to have a certain epistemic status (being justified) directly depends on how one interacts with
other agents: objections don’t exist in abstraction but are issued by particular agents on particular
occasions, and responses are assessed by what states they would bring about in other agents
(whether they assuage the doubt of other agents).
3.2. Filling in the Details

97
98

Ibid., 122.
Annis (1978), pp.213-4.

71

In adopting a variation of the Challenge-Response model of epistemic justification for the
constructivist we want to keep in mind the issue that Reflective Equilibrium faced with respect to
representing others’ differing moral viewpoints. One way to address this issue would be to adopt a
version that most closely resembles the metaphysical basis of the moral facts for the constructivist,
taking quite seriously the aspects of the view that are most procedural. In other words, if the moral
facts are determined by idealized agents jointly deliberating by exchanging considerations for and
against certain moral principles, then our Challenge-Response model of epistemic justification for
moral beliefs would require that actual agents engage in issuing and responding to challenges made
to their belief in order to have a justified belief. On this model, it would only be the case that actual
agents have justified moral beliefs if they have actually received objections and successfully
responded to them, as this challenge-response process would be the way by which we come to gain
justification.
At this point, the picture of epistemic justification put forth begins to sound a bit
implausible. For it seems that one’s belief having a certain epistemic status--being justified--should
at least theoretically be distinct from the act of justifying one’s belief. In fact, this is a common
objection against the Challenge-Response model as an account of epistemic justification: it confuses
being justified with the act of justifying. Even if this weren’t to trouble one too much, though, other
problems follow: for it seems as though it would easily be the case that although one hasn’t ever
actually been challenged by others in holding the moral beliefs that one does, one could still be
epistemically justified in holding them. That is, it seems that if an agent could successfully respond
to challenges made by others, but just happens not to come across any others that do in fact
challenge her belief, we shouldn’t hold it against her--we shouldn’t deny her beliefs the status of
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being epistemically justified. Maintaining that agents must actually go through the
challenge-response process in order to have epistemically justified moral beliefs would lead us into
an implausible or undesirable kind of skepticism.
This thought about what agents could do suggests a variation of the Challenge-Response
Model that less directly resembles the constructivist’s metaphysical process, but nevertheless takes
seriously the lesson learned from how wide Reflective Equilibrium fails. On this variation, it’s not
that an agent must actually go through the process of receiving challenges and adequately
responding to others for every one of their moral beliefs to be justified, but rather that they just
have the ability to do so. More specifically, in order to determine whether an agent in the actual
world had a justified moral belief, we would look to possible worlds in which the agent is
challenged, and determine whether or not she is able to adequately respond to the challenges made
to her in those possible worlds.
In this way, in assessing whether agents currently have justified moral beliefs the
constructivist should adopt a counterfactual variation of the Challenge-Response Model which is
available:
Counterfactual Challenge-Response Model: an agent S is epistemically justified in
believing some moral belief p just in case they have the ability to successfully
undergo the challenge-response process (that is, that in the nearest by possible
world where they are challenged by others they adequately respond to them).

As a constructivist we shouldn’t yet be satisfied with this account of epistemic justification,
though. This is because as the Counterfactual Model is currently spelled out, it is vastly
underdescribed. We still need to say what this ability consists in or requires, which challenges or
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objections are those that must be adequately responded to (for obviously requiring that an agent be
able to respond to every challenge imaginable is much too strict to avoid skepticism), as well as
what an adequate response consists in and which agents one must adequately respond to in order to
have an epistemically justified moral belief. The aim of this section is to clarify these parameters of
the account.
Let’s start with filling in the notion of this ability. How are we to understand what this
ability to respond to the challenges of others amounts to? What needs to be true of the agent in
order for it to be the case that they have this ability? Even though what is important in determining
whether an agent’s moral belief is epistemically justified is what is going on in nearby possible
worlds (whether the agent successfully responds to the challenges presented to her there), it seems
that the agent will nevertheless need to have certain features or meet certain conditions in the
actual world in order to plausibly be said to have this ability and thereby achieve these
challenge-response tasks in nearby possible worlds. For example, in order to truly say that I have
the ability to make a half court shot in basketball--that in some nearby possible world I do so--when
I’ve never done so in the actual world, certain things need to be the case about me in the actual
world. Plausibly, it would need to be that I have good aim and have thrown the basketball long
distances, that I’ve practiced and succeeded at making other long-distance shots. It would be quite
implausible to say that I have the ability to make a half-court shot when in the actual world I can’t
even make a three-point shot. Without having practiced and developed in the actual world the
constitutive skills required to make a half-court shot, one cannot truly say that one has the ability to
make a half-court shot (that in some nearby possible world one makes such a shot). Abilities don’t
just appear out of nowhere, but need to be trained up. Likewise, in order to truly say that one has
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the ability to adequately respond to the challenges of others--that in nearby possible worlds one
actually does this--it would plausibly have to be the case that the agent has already exercised and
trained up her response muscles in the actual world. Put more literally: it would have to be the case
that the agent has practiced engaging with and responded to the challenges of objecting others in
the actual world. So, while the counterfactual Challenge-Response model doesn’t hold agents
captive to having to run through the challenge and response process for every belief in order for
that belief to be epistemically justified (focusing on the ability instead), it nevertheless would seem
to require that actual agents directly engage with others in the actual world to a certain degree.
This way of understanding the ability involved in the Counterfactual Challenge-Response
Model shows how, like Reflective Equilibrium, it is an account both for epistemic assessment (for
determining when moral beliefs are justified) and of a process (how to go about making one’s moral
beliefs justified). As an account of epistemic assessment, it holds that agents’ moral beliefs are
epistemically justified just in case in the nearest by possible world where they are challenged by
others they are able to adequately respond to them. As an account of the process by which to gain
justification, it holds that an agent should go about engaging with actual others with alternative
moral viewpoints, running through the challenge-response procedure itself.
We should now try to get clearer on what exactly a challenge or objection is. Most
minimally, a challenge or objection is a claim that disputes the truth of the belief, or is an expression
of doubt of the truth of the belief. A more theoretically robust way to characterize a challenge or
object is as a certain kind of epistemic possibility, or, more specifically, a way the world could be
where one’s belief would be false. To use a non-moral example: if my belief was that I had hands
because I perceive myself having hands, a challenge would be that I am being deceived by an evil
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demon. As a moral example, if my belief was that abortion is morally permissible because fetuses
aren’t persons, a challenge would be that fetuses are persons. This way of characterizing challenges
stays true to the heart of the Challenge-Response model, as talk of these kinds of epistemic
possibilities is central to contextualist views in epistemology.99
The next question is what an adequate response consists in. Both Wellman and Annis have
explicitly put forth answers to this question. For Wellman, it involves the attitudes of the agents in
the objector group when they are suitably idealized: that is, that if these agents were rational, they
would rescind their challenge, or, in other words, no longer find the possibility to be a serious
threat to one’s belief.100 Likewise, for Annis, it requires having the agents in the objector group
reject the challenge as a challenge or otherwise recognize “the diminished status of [the objection]
as an objection.”101 One more theoretically robust way to think about this is just that the ideally
rational agents in the objector group need to assign a sufficiently low probability to the epistemic
possibility that serves as the challenge or objection.
Having clarified what the ability requires, what a challenge is, and what an adequate
response is, the fundamental question is which possibilities are relevant--in other words, which
challenges must one respond to in order to have an epistemically justified moral belief? Fortunately,
a lot of work has been devoted to determining a related question in contemporary epistemology
that utilizes talk of epistemic standards, like contextualism. Contextualists hold that the epistemic
status an agent’s belief has (e.g. justified) is determined by features of the context. They have offered
various accounts of relevancy: on some, a possibility is made relevant if it is attended to by the utter;
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on others, relevancy is a matter of being entered into the conversational score.102 For one variation,
the Challenge-Response model can take its cue from a contextualist model wherein relevancy is a
matter of common ground. Common ground is just what is mutually believed or accepted by
multiple agents.103 One way of filling in the details of relevancy of objections is to start by
considering what’s part of the moral common ground between subjects and speakers: that is, what
the shared or accepted values or value systems are between the agent justification is or isn’t being
attributed to, and the agent doing the attributing. This then determines which objector group is
relevant: it is whatever group of people either have or lack common ground (i.e. accepted value or
value systems) with the subject. Once the relevant objector group is determined, the most simple
picture of relevant objections would hold that these are whatever objections are issued from the
relevant objector group. Put more simply, on this common ground variation we would stipulate
how similar or different the value systems of objectors need to be from the subject, and then hold
that in order to have a justified moral belief, the subject must adequately respond to whatever
objections this objector group would put forth.
When determining how similar or different the value systems of the objectors need to be
from the subject using a common ground framework, one plausible constraint would be to say that
those values or value systems that are mutually denied between subject and speaker do not need to
be responded to. This constraint mimics the commonsensical contextualist motivation against
skepticism, which is that if neither subject nor speaker are considering skeptical scenarios, these
scenarios aren’t relevant, and so a subject need not be able to rule them out in order for their belief
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to gain the relevant kind of epistemic credit. Given this constraint, this variation would secure the
commonsensical thought that when both the subject and speaker are, for example, anti-racist, the
subject need not respond to objections from white supremacists. At the same time, it seems that
when subject and speaker diverge on their shared values, justification should become more difficult
to achieve, as the objections should broaden. Given this, another constraint can be added: the
subject must respond to values or value systems that are upheld by the speaker, including those
shared by the subject (which will usually be easily met), and those not shared by the subject. This
means that when, for example, an animals rights activist is being assessed by a non-animal rights
activist, the animals rights activist would need to be able to respond to objections from non-animal
rights activists. So, for example, if the animal rights activist had the moral belief that eating meat is
morally impermissible, they would need to be able to respond to the objection from the non-animal
rights activist that animals aren’t a part of the moral community.
But there is another alternative variation of the Challenge-Response model one could
choose. On this model, which possibilities are relevant are determined by the practical stakes
involved in holding the belief. More particularly, if the epistemic possibility, if true, would affect the
relevant subject’s or subjects’ preference ordering of actions to do, then it is relevant, or, on this
model, is a claim that the agent must adequately respond to.104 If we adopt this account of how
epistemic possibilities are determined as relevant, then the question of who the relevant objectors
or objector group is becomes the question of whose practical interests are relevant. Here the
constructivist has a number of options: for example, they can say all sentient creatures, or all agents,

For such stakes models regarding epistemic justification and knowledge within non-moral epistemology, see Fantl &
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or those agents who whose lives would be affected by the belief if it were acted on, or the agents
who are included in the constructivist procedure itself (e.g. agents who take there to be reason to
live with others and are themselves reasonable), etc.
Having answered these questions, we can now sketch each version of the
Challenge-Response Model:
Counterfactual Common Ground Challenge-Response Model: an agent S is
epistemically justified in believing some moral belief p just in case in the closest
possible world where S is presented with a set of alternative possibilities issued by an
objector group which includes the speaker and whose values partially but not
completely overlap with S, S responds in such a way as to make the agents in the
objector group assign a sufficiently low probability to these alternative possibilities.
105

Counterfactual Stakes Challenge-Response Model: an agent S is epistemically
justified in believing some moral belief p just in case in the closest possible world
where S is presented with a set of alternative possibilities issued by some agent(s)
wherein if these counterpossibilities were to be true, it would affect the preference
orderings of any or all these agents, S responds in such a way as to make these agents
that presented S with these alternative possibilities assign a sufficiently low
probability to them.

3.3. A Better Model
Now equipped with an understanding of the Challenge-Response Model, we should
evaluate it against Reflective Equilibrium. It is not my purpose here to defend the
Challenge-Response Model as the correct model of epistemic justification in general, nor the
correct model of epistemic justification for moral beliefs in general, although it does have my
sympathies. Rather, the question that we now face is why this account of epistemic justification

There are, of course, more details to be worked out on this model, e.g. what determines closeness of worlds, and thus
the exact degree of similarity between the subject’s and speaker’s/objector group’s moral viewpoints. I am not going to
address these questions here, but rather leave them for further development.
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would be fitting for the constructivist’s moral epistemology in particular. Does it face the same
epistemic objections? Does it better secure epistemic justification given the constructivist’s moral
metaphysics?
First, let’s consider how the model fares against the traditional objections to Reflective
Equilibrium. Remember that the two classic objections to Reflective Equilibrium are given in virtue
of Reflective Equilibrium being a coherentist view. First, there’s the “garbage in, garbage out”
objection, which holds that the procedure can’t secure that our beliefs will come to be any closer to
the truth by merely bringing them into coherence with the rest of our beliefs. Second, there is the
objection that our initial judgments or intuitions should be given no weight given that they are
most likely the product and reflection of our particular upbringing and biases, and thus that there’s
no reason to bring our beliefs into coherence with them. Given that these are traditional objections
against coherentist accounts, the Challenge-Response model does not face them, as it is a
contextualist account. More particularly, coherency is not a constraint or marker of success on the
Challenge-Response Model. One’s moral beliefs aren’t any more justified because they are in
coherence with one’s other moral beliefs: rather, the justification of one’s moral beliefs is
determined based on the adequacy of one’s responses (or, more particularly, the ability for one to
give such responses). In this way, the Challenge-Response model embraces external--not just
internal--constraints on epistemic justification. Additionally, talk of initial judgments hold no place
on the Challenge-Response Model: if one is unable to respond to the relevant objections, then one’s
moral belief is not justified, and one has no reason to bring one’s other moral beliefs into
conformity with it. Moreover, this model importantly maintains one of the main advantages of
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Reflective Equilibrium: namely, it provides an uncomplicated and straightforward method, not
positing any kind of special faculty or sense.
However, even if the Challenge-Response Model avoids the classic coherentist objections
against Reflective Equilibrium, it remains indeterminate whether it secures epistemic justification
given the constructivist’s characterization of the moral facts. Remember here that Reflective
Equilibrium’s attempt to secure epistemic justification didn’t adequately represent the social
dimension of the constructivist procedure, as it is, in the end, a form of internal reflection. More
particularly, the issue was that its process of individual agents considering alternative moral
viewpoints that could possibly be upheld by others by representing these alternative viewpoints
themselves appears to be prone to errors of misrepresentation, and thus non-truth tracking.
The Challenge-Response Model, though, appears to do much better on this front, for the
model is fundamentally social, in the sense that one’s social relations directly determine the
epistemic standing of one’s moral beliefs. More particularly, the Challenge-Response Model doesn’t
require that an agent represent others’ moral perspectives, but instead has these others represent
their own moral perspectives, where the epistemic standing of an agent’s moral beliefs is
determined with respect to whether they adequately respond to these others in nearby possible
worlds. Since it does not require that agents represent others’ moral viewpoints, there is no risk of
misrepresentation of the kind Reflective Equilibrium is prone to.
However, one may think that although the Challenge-Response Model doesn’t explicitly
require representing others’ moral viewpoints, it nevertheless entails it given its outline of the
process by which to come to have justified moral beliefs. This is because, one may think, in order
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for agents to have the ability to adequately respond to the challenges of others, they would need to
represent the objections and moral viewpoints of these others, since these others will many times be
merely possible or hypothetical. But this is not the case. Remember here that this ability contained
within the Challenge-Response Model plausibly requires that agents actually engage with others
who occupy alternative moral viewpoints, thus practicing giving responses to objections and
training up this skill. So even with regards to gaining this ability and completing this process of the
model, agents are not representing others’ moral viewpoints, and so there is no risk of
misrepresentation.
Yet, even if one agrees that the Challenge-Response Model is not vulnerable to the risk of
misrepresenting others’ moral viewpoints, one may now wonder whether Reflective Equilibrium
really is either. For if the Challenge-Response Model holds that the process by which agents come
to secure epistemic justification for their moral beliefs is by giving responses to objections by
actually engaging with others in the actual world who represent their moral viewpoints themselves,
why can’t the proponent of Reflective Equilibrium say just that as well? Why can’t they say that in
order for an agent to bring her moral beliefs into equilibrium with alternative moral principles and
thus gain justification she must engage with actual others who hold those alternative moral
principles in order to accurately represent them in her process of bringing her moral beliefs into
equilibrium with them?
The issue here isn’t so much that the proponent of Reflective Equilibrium is barred from
utilizing this strategy, but rather that doing so is ad-hoc and no longer in the spirit of the view. For
while actually engaging with others who occupy alternative moral perspectives is a constitutive
element of the moral epistemology of the Challenge-Response theorist (by being what the ability
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amounts to)--namely, it is the process the model outlines by which to gain justified moral beliefs--it
would merely be tacked on to what the Reflective Equilibrium theorist antecedently requires for
epistemic justification. What Reflective Equilibrium requires and takes as the focus of securing
epistemic

goods

like

justification

is

equilibrium

or

coherency,

whereas what the

Challenge-Response Model requires is that one have a certain ability, which itself requires actually
engaging with others. Remember here that both views outline a process which agents can follow in
order to make their moral beliefs justified, and that these processes di fer from one another. The
problem is that Reflective Equilibrium already has specified a process for agents to use to come to
have justified moral beliefs: namely, work back and forth between your particular moral judgments
and moral principles until coherency is reached. Although it is not inconsistent for the proponent of
Reflective Equilibrium to adopt the process of the Challenge-Response Model, they would either
have to replace this equilibrium process they originally specified with that outlined by the
Challenge-Response Model, or, come to have a disunified account, embracing two processes.
Although the way in which the Challenge-Response theorist avoids the issue of misrepresentation
is in principle available to the proponent of Reflective Equilibrium, it would be terribly
unmotivated and ad-hoc for them to adopt, and thus the Challenge-Response Model fares better.106
In order to have a justified belief, one must be able to adequately engage with
others--including those with opposing moral viewpoints. The Challenge-Response Model’s
epistemic constraint that agents have the ability to adequately engage with others, and thus practice
and use their ability to respond to other’s objections in the actual world, highlights another point of

Remember here that my goal in this paper is not to provide a knock-down argument against Reflective Equilibrium.
Rather, I am pointing to a set of shortcomings for its suitability as a model of epistemic justification for moral beliefs
given a constructivist moral metaphysics, and providing a sketch of what I take to be a better model.
106
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attractiveness of the model. Namely, it more closely represents the metaphysical procedure that
determines the moral facts for the constructivist. Since the moral facts are fixed by a multitude of
agents, instead of engaging in a kind of internal reflection wherein agents themselves represent
others’ moral viewpoints, in seeking moral knowledge agents must instead be able to interact with
other agents in ways that resemble the kind of process or procedure utilized in the idealized
normative-fact generating world. Provided that it’s best to have an epistemic procedure that is
isomorphic with respect to the metaphysical nature of the facts, the Challenge-Response Model
better accounts for how agents are in a position to receive the kind of epistemic justification needed
for the constructivist.
In the end, the Challenge-Response Model provides us with a picture of epistemic
justification wherein the way in which we come to have epistemically justified moral beliefs
resembles the way in which the moral facts themselves are fixed. Being epistemically justified in
holding a moral belief requires having the ability to engage in an adequate way with others. This
necessary condition of epistemic justification is due to the moral subject matter of these beliefs,
given our constructivist assumptions about morality. While for other kinds of beliefs it may not be
the case that one’s failing to engage with others affects the epistemic status of one’s belief at all, it is
the case for moral beliefs precisely because of what they are like, according to the constructivist.

4. Conclusion
In this paper, I have outlined an alternative moral epistemology for the moral constructivist.
After putting forth an understanding of moral constructivism, I argued that the traditional
84

epistemic model for the constructivist--Reflective Equilibrium--faces several issues, most notably
that it fails to adequately account for the social nature of the metaphysical basis of the moral facts.
Given these issues, and the fact that having a commonsensical account of moral knowledge is one of
constructivism’s greatest strengths, the constructivist should seek alternative epistemic accounts. I
then put forth such an alternative account, the Challenge-Response Model, according to which an
agent has a justified moral belief just in case they are able to adequately respond to all relevant
objections from a relevant objector group. I concluded by arguing that the Challenge-Response
Model is a better epistemic model for the constructivist, as it avoids the problems faced by
Reflective Equilibrium and is fundamentally social, thus better securing epistemic justification.
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Chapter 4
“Social-based Theories of Reasons and the Limits of Oppression”

0. Introduction
A new kind of non-objectivist theory of practical reasons has recently come to attention:
social-based views, which hold that an agent’s practical reasons are a function of the social
institutions, practices, and relations (IPRs) she takes part in.107 More particularly, for a reason to be
social-based it must stem from features of the IPR itself, rather than the individual. For example, it
seems as though you have reasons to keep your friend’s secrets just in virtue of being a friend, rather
than because it would be personally advantages for yourself to do so or because you have any kinds
of pro-attitudes towards doing so. Social-based views are able to make sense of these
commonsensical judgments. Moreover, others have argued that social-based views carry additional
advantages as a theory of practical reasons: they can make sense of partial reasons, provide an apt
explanation of agents’ moral psychology, can account for the motivational character of normative
reasons, and can account for how we are beholden to others.108 Furthermore, as a kind of
non-objectivist theory, social-based views are able to provide these benefits without taking on the
burdens objectivist theories are faced with, as they are able to maintain a straightforward and simple
account of the metaphysics and epistemology of normative reasons.

There is nothing in the nature of social-based views that in principle bars them from being objectivist views. I
introduce the view this way since the social-based views previously put forth, and the one I ultimately advance, are
non-objectivist.
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Manne (2013) argues for the first three particular advantages of a social-based view; Walden (2012) cites the last
consideration as an advantage of social-based views.
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However, social-based views aren’t without their own obstacles. For just as obvious as it
seems that agents have reasons to keep their friends’ secrets in virtue of taking part in the practice
of friendship, it seems that agents don’t have reasons to do just as any social IPR would have them
do. To take an obvious case: just because one happens to take part in the practice of slavery, this
doesn’t entail that one has reasons to act as a slave. In this way, the biggest problem a social-based
view faces is ensuring that only some, and not all, social IPRs generate genuine practical reasons for
agents. The task that the social-based view is set with is determining what it is about these
intuitively bad cases makes it the case that they are not reason generating. To solve this problem,
social-based views must specify certain conditions a social IPR must meet in order for it to be
genuinely normative and generate practical reasons for agents who take part in them.
This paper focuses on one particularly worrisome type of intuitively bad and intuitively
non-normative IPRs: oppressive IPRs. I start in section 1 by first further introducing the concept of
a social-based view of normative reasons, comparing it to individualistic non-objectivist accounts of
normative reasons and motivating the need for a general constraint that such views rule out
oppressive IPRs as genuinely normative and so as generating practical reasons for agents. After
becoming clear on this task for social-based views, in section 2 I consider two contemporary
social-based views, Kenneth Walden’s “Social Constitutivism” and Kate Manne’s “Social Teleology”.
After arguing that each fails to meet this constraint, in section 3 I put forth a new social-based view
that I argue is able to meet the constraint, Looping Social Constructivism. To do so, I utilize a novel
employment of the idealization strategy commonly used in non-objectivist metaethical theories,
wherein the social IPRs that generate genuine reasons for agents are those that are idealized at the
social level. On my view, the IPRs which are reason generating are those that are idealized such that
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each position within the IPR has equal power in constituting the IPR itself. After putting forth the
view I consider several seemingly problematic cases, where I argue that the view has the resources
to rule out even complicated cases of oppressive IPRs.. I close by arguing that one important upshot
Looping Social Constructivism has is that it provides a much needed feminist metaethics.

1. Social-Based Views: An Introduction
Most generally, objectivist views are those that hold that the source of normative truths, like
what reasons an an agent has, lies outside of her desires, projects, or values.109 Contrarily,
non-objectivist views of practical reason hold that the source of an agent’s practical reasons is her
preferences, desires, values, attitudes, projects, or evaluative point of view.110 One such familiar
non-objectivist view is Subjectivism. Importantly, non-objectivist views like Subjectivism must
have some way to ensure that not just any desire that an agent happens to have--no matter how
bizarre or ill-informed--generates reasons for her. Given this overgeneration worry, these
non-objectivist views have appealed to various strategies or conditions under which an agent’s
evaluative point of view generates reasons. Some, like Bernard Williams, utilize idealization,
wherein an agent’s reasons are a function of her idealized self who has no false beliefs and all
relevant true beliefs; others have appealed to consistency and coherency, holding that an agent’s
reasons are a function of her desires and values after they are brought to be consistent and coherent.
111

See, for example, Scanlon (2014), Enoch (2011), and Parfit (2011). Of course, there is always much disagreement over
what counts as an objectivist view and what doesn’t. For the sake of this paper I will be understanding objectivist views
in this way. For the sake of simplicity the brief discussion of non-objectivist views that follows does not address more
complicated views like Constitutivism or Kantian Constructivism.
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See for example Williams (1980), Schroeder (2007), and Street (2009), amongst many others.
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For the former, see Williams (1980); for the latter see Street (2009).
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Social-based theories of practical reasons differ from individualistic views like Subjectivism
by holding that an agent’s reasons are a function of some kind of the social institutions, practices, or
relations (IPRs) that they find themselves in. Although both individualistic views and social-based
views can be non-objectivist theories, they differ in holding whether an agent’s reasons are
dependent solely on her own beliefs, values and norms, or on her social group’s/IPR’s (broadly
construed) beliefs, values and norms. Just as individualistic non-objectivist theories can differ from
each other by holding that an agent’s reasons are a function of different or differently idealized
cognitive or affective mental states, social-based views can differ from each other by holding that an
agent’s reasons are a function of different or differently idealized IPRs. This is important because
just as individualistic non-objectivist theories like Subjectivism don’t say that an agent’s reasons are
a function of whatever desires she happens to currently have, a social-based view also shouldn’t hold
that whatever social IPRs agents happen to find themselves in, all of them are genuinely normative
and generate reasons for all of those agents. For there are many problematic social IPRs that are
noxious for the agents embedded within them. It would be a transparently fatal defect in such a
theory if it were to have the consequence that, for example, the institution of slavery was normative
and generated genuine reasons for agents who take part in the institution, including those who are
slaves.112
The institution of slavery represents one type of particularly noxious social IPR, namely
oppressive ones. Social-based views should be mindful of oppressive IPRs and be sure to rule them
out as genuinely normative for two reasons. First, oppressive IPRs like slavery are especially

I am relying on an incontrovertible first-order judgment or intuition, not any kind of theory of the good, to make
this objection. Additionally, I am not ruling out that agents may have genuine practical reasons to take part in or
otherwise abide by the constitutive norms of those practices, but just that the source of their reasons to do so is not the
institution itself, but rather, for example, their own self-interest. I’m grateful to Hille Paakkunainen for bringing this
point to my attention.
112
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abhorrent, and, as such, may be grounds to reject any theory that determines them as genuinely
normative for agents. This is because one major complaint against non-objectivist views like
Humean Constructivism or Subjectivism is that they entail that certain lamentable individual
conditions are genuinely normative and reason-generating for agents who have them (e.g. that
those suffering from anorexia have reasons not to eat because of their desire to be thin).113 Provided
that we should take these complaints as serious grounds for rejection for individualistic
non-objectivist theories, we should likewise take complaints about the normativity of oppressive
IPRs as genuine grounds for rejection for social-based theories. Moreover, though, oppression is a
group phenomenon: it does not operate on the individual level, but rather affects groups, and
individuals only in so far as they are members of certain social groups.114 Just as some might
conceive of mental conditions like anorexia or depression as a defect within the individual,
oppression could in this way be viewed as a defect within social IPRs, or on the social-level. Because
social-based theorists locate practical normativity on the social level, this pernicious phenomenon
pertains particularly to them, and should demand any social-based theorist’s attention.
Importantly, though, there are two versions of this challenge of ruling out oppressive IPRs
as normative. On the strongest version, the theorist must guarantee that it’s impossible on their
theory for oppressive IPRs to be normative; on the other, weaker version, they must only rule out
oppressive IPRs as normative in ordinary circumstances (excluding from assessment implausible,
very unlikely, or merely possible circumstances). In what follows, I will focus on the latter version
of the challenge.
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See Gibbard (1990) for this criticism, and Street (2009) and and Sobel (2016) for a defense.
See, for example, Frye (1983) and Cudd (2006).
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Since social-based views are non-objectivist, in order to avoid the issue of oppressive IPRs
they must specify which IPRs are the ones that generate legitimately normative reasons by
specifying the conditions or criteria an IPR must meet in order to be reason-generating. Call these
reason-generating conditions or “RGC”s for short. In the next section, I will examine two
contemporary social-based views--Kenneth Walden’s “Social Constitutivism” and Kate Manne’s
“Social Teleology”--which specify different RGC’s, arguing that both fail to rule out oppressive IPRs
as genuinely normative.115

2. Contemporary Social-Based Views
2.1. Walden’s Social Constitutivism
Constitutivist views hold that an agent’s reasons are a function of the constitutive norms of
agency as such.116 Kenneth Walden (2012) argues that one of the constitutive norms of agency is
that one’s actions be appropriately explainable. More specifically, he holds that in order to be an
agent, one’s action needs to be interpretable by others under some laws of interpretation; otherwise,
one’s action is mere behavior. Walden’s view is social because the laws of interpretation which serve
as the constitutive norms of agency are themselves socially determined and constructed through a
mutual interpretation process, and as such can manifest not just in a one-off way--as laws that
govern isolated instances of single actions--but also as broad social organizations and structures. In
this process, agents try to explain others’ behavior under the best laws of agency at their disposal
while at the same time trying to conform their own behavior to the same laws. Put more simply,

Of course, this is not to say that these views fail to solve other overgeneration, or “too many reasons” problems. My
point is that failing to rule out oppressive IPRs is especially bad, and thus that any social-based view that fails to do so is
untenable.
116
See, for example, Korsgaard (2009) and (2011) for such a view.
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agents try to interpret others’ behavior in ways that makes it understandable to them, while at the
same time trying to behave in ways that are understandable to others. This makes for a kind of
mutual construction and revision wherein agents are constantly adjusting their behavior to fit the
socially-determined laws of interpretation, and the socially-determined laws of interpretation are
constantly being adjusted to fit agents’ actions.
The aim of such an interpretation process, Walden holds, is to reach a kind of equilibrium
or general stability between agents’ actions and their explanations of others’ actions. Given this,
Walden’s RGC is stability. An agent’s reasons, then, are a function of the relatively stable
socially-determined laws of interpretation: an agent has reasons to do that which is interpretable as
action under stable laws of interpretation set by this social process of mutual construction and
revision of such laws, including those manifested as social structures or practices. As Walden states,
“. . . any social organization that adequately approximated the equilibrium of the Mutual
Interpretation Process [has] normative force, and these constitutions qualify. So . . . the denizens of
these societies really ought to behave in conformity with their particular constitutions of agency
because that is what it takes for them to act.”117 In short: an agent has reasons to behave according
to, and thus maintain and perpetuate, the current laws of interpretation--the current social
structures or organizations--provided that they are stable enough.118
The problem with Walden’s view is one that he himself recognizes: that it seems possible
for there to be societies with relatively stable laws of interpretation which are nevertheless
“wicked”. For instance, it seems that a racially segregated society could have laws of interpretation
that are stable enough, such that by Walden’s account agents supposedly would have reasons to do
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Walden (2012), p.75.
Ibid., pp. 52, 69-75.
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as those laws prescribe (engage in acts of segregation and generally uphold segregated institutions).
But, since Walden’s view is a form of constitutivism, we would be without the grounds to criticize
the agent--in fact, in such a society, in not acting to as to maintain segregation an agent would be
risking not acting and not being considered an agent at all.
Walden’s response to such a challenge is that while such societies appear to have stable laws
of interpretation, they in fact aren’t stable. This is because, Walden claims, “the very features of
those societies that made wicked things permissible, even obligatory, were also sources of
instability.”119 In arguing for such a claim, Walden tells a few “just-so” stories: for example, he claims
that the Jim Crow South revolved around an ideology that held persons of color to be essentially
and biologically different than whites, and that such an ideology was a source of instability, as the
claims about race that were central to the ideology were undermined by new scholarship on race.120
Setting aside the weakness of “just-so” stories, several problems remain with Walden’s view.
121

First, even if Walden’s “just-so” story regarding the Jim Crow South were correct, it certainly

would not undermine the initial charge made against Walden’s view that it’s quite possible for there
to be relatively stable yet wicked societies or laws of interpretation. For one, the catalyst of the
instability of Jim Crow South that Walden cites--new scholarship on race and segregation--is not
necessary, nor even probable: it seems at least just as probable that no new scholarship would have
emerged as that new scholarship on race did emerge under those conditions. In fact, it seems

Ibid., p. 76.
For those who are not familiar with “just-so” stories, they are ad hoc and unverifiable explanations that are often put
forth as suspiciously tailor-made to suit the broader project or theory (more precisely, an aspect of the theory that is
crucial to its soundness is posited in the explanation of certain phenomena that seems directly opposed to the theory in a
way that is prima facie doubtful and externally unverifiable). They are often used and criticized for their use in
evolutionary psychology.
121
Just-so stories themselves have well-known weaknesses, which I won’t elaborate on here. Rather, I’m particularly
worried about Walden’s use of them to overcome the oppression overgeneration worry; that is, even setting aside these
general issues with just-so stories, there are particular problems with Walden’s use of them here.
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extraordinary that scholarship that flew in the face of such an extreme ideology even occurred. This
subversive scholarship should be viewed more as miraculous than expected given that one feature of
ideologies is that they are self-perpetuating. Moreover, Walden’s “just-so” story rests on the claim
that the source of the oppressive ideology’s instability was false empirical beliefs. However, plenty of
unjust ideologies are not based on false empirical beliefs (for example, it’s very possible to have one
based on beliefs like “those in power ought to stay in power”). If all of this is right, then Walden’s
ability to tell a “just-so” story to explain away the supposed stability of one oppressive society does
not yet explain how such oppressive yet stable societies are unlikely.
Furthermore, while Walden’s view makes societies and their laws of interpretation
revisable, the ways in which Walden states agents are able to change the laws is also objectionable.
Walden pictures change (or as he calls it “normative revolutions”) as coming about through the
violation of the current norms, but not through just any kind of violation. The kind of behavior
that demands adjustment in the current norms is that which “is at the margins of intelligibility.”
This is because “behavior that is too far out of step with the reigning constitution of agency will be
dismissed as lunacy.”122 Taking the Jim Crow South case, this means that in order to change the
oppressive, racist norms of segregation, the kind of behavior that agents--specifically persons of
color--should engage in shouldn’t defy these norms too much; for example, these agents could
perhaps refuse to give up their seat on a segregated bus, but they shouldn’t engage in armed protests
or marry whites, or simply demand equal civil rights across the board, for that’s just “lunacy,” as
Walden would say.123 Walden’s views on normative change are so objectionable because they

Ibid., p. 76.
Walden cites Rosa Parks as a case where an agent’s behavior was at the ‘margins of intelligibility’ and thus was an
appropriate inciting case of a ‘normative revolution’ and at the same time still action. Of course, it is going to be vague
and a matter of degree what kinds of defiant behavior are too defiant to be considered action and those doing it agents; I
cite the cases of the Black Panther movement and interracial marriage as plausible candidates of actions that would be
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require those who are oppressed to be patient with their oppression and to appease their
oppressors, lest their behavior be deemed “lunacy” and they themselves not even counted as agents.
124

Not only is this offensive, but it also seems untrue: why can’t--and furthermore why

shouldn’t--social revolutions happen in drastic sweeps rather than tiny chips? And shouldn’t those
at the front of the lines of such drastic overhauls be considered more of an agent, instead of less of
one?125
Given these considerations, Walden’s constitutivism fails to rule out oppressive institutions
as normative, such that there can still be oppressive societies where agents have reasons to maintain
and perpetuate its institutions--including the oppressed themselves. Furthermore, Walden’s view is
especially bad because it holds that agents have reason not to demand drastic social change (and that
doing so would disqualify them as agents).
2.2. Manne’s Social Teleology
Kate Manne’s (2013) social-based view holds that an agent’s reasons are grounded in social
practices that they participate in. Specifically, Manne claims that reasons are generated via the
constitutive norms of particular social practices. For instance, the social practice of friendship has
certain constitutive norms like to be loyal and trustworthy, which generate reasons for agents who
are in friendships; such reasons will be reasons to, for example, stand by one’s friend when they are
in need and keep one’s friend’s secrets.

considered ‘unintelligible’ to the majority of whites in the 1960s in the same way that the Mafioso’s violent outbursts are
‘unintelligible’ to the majority of people now, as the ‘unintelligibility’ of the Mafioso case is supposed to set the
parameters of intelligible action (see pp.71-2).
124
To be fair, since Walden is not clear on exactly what would qualify as “lunacy” he might reject these as such cases;
however, such underspecification would then be a failure of his view.
125
At worst, this constraint on normative revolutions would completely eliminate the possibility of such revolutions in
certain contexts where individuals’ beliefs are extremely rigid, for example where their racial prejudices run so deep and
are so dogmatic that any behavior that speaks in favor of racial equality would be considered “lunacy”. One advantage of
the positive view I put forth in section 3 is that it accounts for reasons to resist oppression.
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At the same time, Manne readily admits that the challenge for the social-based theorist is to
specify the conditions under which social IPRs are normative, for surely not just any, or every,
social IPR generates genuine reasons for agents who are ingrained in them. On her broad sketch,
the RGC she endorses is that an IPR be conducive to human “flourishing at large”. Manne’s view is
able to remain sufficiently non-objectivist because this constraint of being conducive to human
flourishing is not an objective normative requirement of valid social IPRs, but rather, Manne
claims, is part of the telos or aim of social IPRs themselves, given by their interpersonal nature:
social IPRs just are the kinds of things that aim at human flourishing at large.126
This is the general outline of her view. Unfortunately, though, since the focus of her work
on social-based views is on motivating social-based views in general rather than putting forth a
fully articulated version of such a view, the details of her view are underspecified. However, in
order to assess whether her view can adequately address the issue of oppressive IPRs, more details
are needed. What she does say, though--specifically, her commitment to non-objectivism and to
neither undergenerating nor overgenerating reasons--suggests the following more detailed picture.
127

First, we can further understand her RGC in the (satisficing) consequentialist sense as
holding that a social IPR needs to produce a sufficient amount of flourishing for all of those who
take part in it, such that we assess an IPR relative to the total amount of flourishing it produces for

Manne (2013), pp.69-70.
This is not to say that there aren’t additional ways to develop the view other than the one I consider here; I do not
consider all of these additional variations of the view, as I am interested in considering only the one that is most faithful
to the text (that is, the one that most closely adheres to the commitments she takes on and what she does explicitly say
about her view).
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all of those who participate in instances of the IPR type.128 Manne clarifies that a social practice
“need only be conducive to human flourishing, rather than having to actually lead to it.”129 In other
words, provided that a social practice type, such as friendship, meets the consequentialist constraint
by creating enough total utility for all of those who participate in friendships, any particular token
of friendship is genuinely normative and generates reasons for all agents who take part in
friendships. This way, one has genuinely normative reasons to help out one’s friend when they’re in
need that one can’t escape merely because there are some friendships that are toxic, and don’t
actually reach the satisficing level of utility for those who partake in them. This qualification saves
her theory from undergenerating reasons. At the other end, Manne’s theory is saved from
overgenerating reasons with its consequentialist constraint on flourishing: IPRs like slavery are
ruled out from generating reasons since they lead to severe suffering for some, thus making the
total utility produced for all of those who take part in it to be less than the amount required to be
normative.130
As an aside, we should first note that there’s a serious question about how her view is
properly social-based, as it’s unclear how flourishing is a property of institutions (like Walden’s
chosen property of stability), rather than individuals.131 However, setting this issue aside, there
remains a serious question about whether Manne can actually balance the under- and
overgenerating constraints against each other. I think that she cannot, due to a dilemma that she
faces given her teleological claim concerning social practices. Remember here that Manne claims

In footnote 48 Manne (2013) seems to endorse a satisficing consequentialist interpretation of her RGC. I spell out
this aspect of the view in terms of those who take part in the IPR, as the cases Manne focuses on seem to track this set of
agents in assessing the validity of the IPR.
129
Ibid., section 4, my italics.
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Ibid., section 4. In this way, my argument is not that Manne’s view cannot avoid any problematic overgeneration, but
rather they it is unable to avoid overgeneration with respect to all oppressive IPRs.
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that social practices have a telos or aim of human flourishing at large; importantly, this is a claim
about the nature of social practices as such. The initial problem, however, is that it seems like many
of our social practices--both current and past--aren’t conducive to human flourishing at large: for
example, just consider slavery, sex trafficking, terrorism, segregation, arranged marriages, the
beauty industry, stop and frisk, the nuclear family, the fast food industry, witch trials, etc.. Given
that so many past and current social practices are defective by not achieving their aim or telos,
Manne’s teleological claim begins to look quite implausible.
This, though, isn’t the main problem, for Manne doesn’t take herself to be burdened with
defending her teleological claim. However, the implausibility of her claim given the above
considerations leaves her with two options: either admit that social practices don’t have a telos of
human flourishing, which would be bad for her non-objectivist view, or hold that a social practice
can have many failings with respect to its telos while still having that telos.132 For example, we can
still maintain that a frog has a telos of catching flies, even though it misses many flies. To maintain
her non-objectivist commitments, it seems like Manne would want to pick the second option, and
maintain her claim that all social practices have this telos of human flourishing at large. If the
second option is chosen, we now face two more options: either (1) maintain that only those social
practice types that meet the consequentialist constraint are valid, or (2) give up this consequentialist
constraint. If we pick option (1), then it seems that we fail to meet the undergeneration constraint,
since, as stated, many of our social practices fail to achieve a decent amount of flourishing. Since
Manne takes herself to be capturing a significant set of practical reasons in providing an account of
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the source of practical reasons (in addition to holding herself quite explicitly to an undergeneration
constraint), accounting for a small set of reasons would be a serious issue for her account.133
Faced with this undergeneration worry, Manne might wish to resist the claim that many
social practices don’t result in flourishing: she might want to say that some of the practices I cited
above, while surely leading to the suffering of some, nevertheless reach the satisficing level of
utility; that is, that even though, for example, our criminal justice system leads to the suffering of
racial minorities, it still produces enough utility, and so many of the social practices I cited above
really do meet the consequentialist constraint and thereby generate enough reasons. However, in
this case her view would face common objections to consequentialism, since it would hold that
those racial minorities who take part in this racist criminal justice system and suffer from it still
have reasons to participate in and maintain it (just as persons who are in abusive friendships would
have reasons to participate in and maintain them, since the practice of friendship on the whole
produces a total sum of flourishing for all that meets the satisficing amount demanded). Likewise,
even if we want to allow Manne her claim that a social practice wouldn’t count as valid if it lead to
the serious suffering of some--which I’m very hesitant to accept, given that her consequentialist
commitments wouldn’t necessarily rule out the extreme suffering of some, provided that it is
counterbalanced by the extreme flourishing of others--surely not all oppressive IPRs lead to the
kind of extreme suffering Manne has in mind when she mentions slavery and sex trafficking (the
other examples of oppressive institutions I cited above testify to this). In this case, some oppressive
institutions would still be ruled as valid under Manne’s theory.

Manne (2013) states at the onset of her paper that the question she is considering is what the source of practical
reasons are, and that we should be optimistic about how many of such reasons her account can capture. See pp. 50 and
70 respectively.
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Remember here that Manne has two options when faced with the fact that many of our
actual social practices fail to achieve flourishing: either (1) maintain that only those social practice
types that meet the consequentialist constraint are valid, or (2) give up this consequentialist
constraint. We saw that option (1) won’t work, for two reasons. It either undergenerates reasons,
or, if in seeking to avoid this undergeneration worry Manne were to deny that many social practices
don’t result in flourishing, the view faces consequentialist objections by ruling in as normative
oppressive IPRs which seem to produce enough flourishing at the expense of those they oppress. If,
then, seeking to avoid these consequentialist objections and generating too few reasons, we were to
take option (2), we fail to meet the overgeneration constraint: now a social practice can fail to reach
the satisficing level of flourishing while still qualifying as valid.134 In this case, the oppressive
practices that were supposed to be ruled out at the start like sex trafficking now count as valid.135
So, no matter which option we take, Manne’s view fails to rule out oppressive IPRs as genuinely
normative.

3. Looping Social Constructivism

To be clear, I don’t think Manne intends to take option (2), but rather outline it as a possible option that is available.
Another option would be to endorse some additional validity constraint. In fact, Manne seems to go in for this option
when she states “I am inclined to think, moreover, that social practices must not be prone to bring serious suffering to
anybody in the moral community, in order to count as valid” (2013), p.71. Unfortunately, Manne does not say anything
more specific about this additional condition. Regardless of the details of this additional condition, I do not take it up
here, as endorsing such a condition would seem to bring with it more problems than it solves. In addition to making the
view disjointed and gerrymandered (as now the view would posit another condition that is of an entirely different kind),
this strategy seems ad hoc, and would push Manne into objectivism, as she must account for the nature of this
constraint, and cannot appeal to teleological grounds (as a social practice can’t coherently both have the telos of
flourishing at large and not bringing serious suffering to anybody). Since Manne leaves the satisficing dimension of her
view undefined, she might also wish to appeal it, claiming that the level of utility rules in just enough social practices to
not undergenerate reasons, while ruling out the oppressive ones. Even if finding such an exact level were possible,
doing so would seem to be ad hoc.
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In the last section, we saw two contemporary social-based views fail to rule out oppressive
IPRs as genuinely normative. Note how each view attempted to meet this constraint: namely, by
putting forth certain RGC’s that a social IPR must meet in order to generate reasons. For Walden,
the RGC was stability of the IPR. For Manne, it was that the IPR be conducive to human
flourishing at large, in the satisficing consequentialist sense. Of note is that both RGC’s put forth
were properties of actual IPRs--that is, properties that IPRs of the actual world must instantiate in
order to generate reasons.
In this section, I’ll articulate an alternative social-based view that, I will argue, is able to rule
out oppressive social IPRs as normative in a non-objectivist and content-neutral way.136 Moreover,
not only does the view I put forth meet this overgeneration constraint, but it also provides an
account of reasons for resistance of oppression. The way in which this view differs from the two
previous views discussed is with respect to the validity conditions for social IPRs. Specifically, my
view endorses a strategy often utilized by individualistic non-objectivist views--idealization--in a
novel way: I argue that social IPRs need to be idealized at the social level. On my view, the IPRs that
generate reasons are those that are idealized such that each position within the IPR has equal power
to determine the constitution of the IPR itself.
First, I will offer a further analysis of the structure of social IPRs. Then, I will show how
idealizing at the social level would affect the mechanics of social IPRs, thereby ensuring that no
IPRs that are idealized in this way would be both oppressive and genuinely normative. As I do so, I
will explore various ways the adherent to this view may fill in numerous details of the view and

By “content-neutral” I mean that the view does not specify which particular IPR types (e.g. friendships, marriage,
basketball, slavery) are genuinely normative by their being that type, nor by their upholding certain objective values
(e.g. being just), but rather specifies which IPRs are genuinely normative by their having certain proceduralist or
non-normative features or conditions (e.g. all of the agents who take part in them are fully-informed of all the
non-normative facts).
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respond to some worries. Lastly, I will briefly show how my view fares well across several
constraints for a feminist metaethics.
3.1. The Structure of Social IPRs
Social IPRs are structured in a particular way.137 First, IPRs consist of nodes, or positions
that individuals occupy, which designate rights, responsibilities, privileges, duties, expectations, and
power. Take, as an innocuous toy example, the social practice of basketball. Within this practice,
different individuals occupy different nodes: the players occupy different nodes than the coach, and,
additionally, each player occupies a different node relative to the position they play. Given their
occupation of different nodes, they have different responsibilities, expectations, and power: while
the coach is responsible for calling the plays, the players are responsible for scoring points (or, more
specifically, the point guard is responsible for handling and controlling the ball, the shooting guard
is responsible for taking perimeter shots, the center for getting offensive rebounds and scoring
inside the paint, and so on). These rights, responsibilities, privileges, duties, and power are
distributed according to constitutive norms: what it is to be a basketball coach is to call the plays,
what it is to be a point guard is to control the ball, etc.
Secondly, the choices, options, and actions of individuals within a social IPR are defined
relationally.138 This means that individual choices and actions cannot be properly understood in
isolation, but rather are determined relative to the relations that an individual stands in to others,
and their position within the structure of the practice as a whole (the node they occupy). For
example, if we are to understand why Kyrie Irving drove to the hoop, it’s insufficient to say that it’s
because he had an open lane. Rather, we should say that it’s because Kevin Love blocked Irving’s
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Much of what I say in this section follows Haslanger’s (2012a) analysis of social IPRs.
See Haslanger (2012a) and (2014).
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defender by setting a screen, thus opening up a lane for Irving. This feature of social IPRs can also
be illustrated with less conventional examples. Concerning the social practice of (heterosexual and
binary) parenting: when trying to understand why women (rather than men) typically decide to exit
the workforce to take care of the child, it is insufficient to merely say that it’s because women prefer
or simply choose to spend more time with their children. Rather, the optimal explanation makes
reference to the fact that maternal, but not paternal, leave is available, and that typically couples can
afford only to have one parent stay out of the workforce.139
Finally, social IPRs are structured by a looping e fect that obtains between the agents within
the IPR and the IPR and its norms. Ian Hacking explains the looping effect as a phenomenon that
occurs when agents are classified in a certain way (e.g. as X’s), become aware of their classification
as such (e.g. I am an X), behave differently in virtue of their awareness of such classification, and
thus change the thing being classified (e.g. what it is to be an X).140 At the level of social IPRs,
looping can be understood as a kind of feedback mechanism wherein the norms of IPRs constrain
and govern the behavior of the agents who constitute it, but at the same time the agents that
constitute the IPR are able to adjust the IPR and its constitutive norms through their behavior.141
To see how this works in practice, consider the social practice of parenting again. In the past, the
constitutive norms of parenting designated that women stay home to raise the child and men stay in
the workforce. However, as time passed and opportunities for employment increased, women
started joining the workforce, thus adjusting the constitutive norm of parenting that women stay

This case is taken from Haslanger (2012a) and is originally due to Cudd (2006).
Hacking (2001).
141
A careful reader will notice similarities here between Walden’s “Mutual Interpretation Process” and the looping effect
as discussed here. Walden takes inspiration from the looping effect as discussed by Hacking (2001), but applies it to the
“laws of interpretation” or constitutive norms of agency that he posits; here, I keep more strictly to Hacking’s account of
the looping effect, noting its place in the basic structure of IPRs themselves, rather than any norms of agency as such.
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home to raise the child to the norm that it be ensured that the child is being cared for by someone
(e.g. child care workers) while the parents are at work, but not that the caring necessarily be done
by either parent. In this way, IPRs aren’t totally rigid, but rather can change both their constitutive
norms and the way in which they’re structured (the way in which rights, responsibilities, and power
are distributed across the particular nodes and the way the nodes stand to one another).
3.2. IPRs Idealized
As stated previously, social-based views must specify RGC’s an IPR must meet in order to
generate reasons. More particularly, the RGC’s that are set need to be able to rule out oppressive
social IPRs as genuinely normative. Although idealizing has been widely employed by
non-objectivist theories of practical reasons, it has been applied to individual agents--at the
individual level--rather than at the social level.142
I propose that the RGC social IPRs must meet is a condition of idealization, such that an
agent’s reasons are a function of the suitably idealized social IPRs she takes part in. Importantly,
idealizing at the institutional or social level would be a matter of adjusting the way in which the
practice or institution itself is structured. There are a few options one could take when considering
how to adjust the structure of the IPR so as to rule out oppressive IPRs.
Initially, one might think that oppressive IPRs are noxious simply because individual
choices and options are relationally constrained by other agents. Having one’s choices and options

Again, to be clear, neither Walden nor Manne utilize idealization strategies. Both look to the social IPRs in the actual
world, and assess which of these in fact has some property (producing enough flourishing, being sufficiently stable); the
source of an agent’s reasons is the IPRs in the actual world that in fact instantiate those properties. Very generally and
abstractly, one way to understand this difference is that idealization strategies take something in the actual world, adjust
it in certain ways, and then hold that the normative facts in the actual world are determined by this possible/non-actual
adjustment of the thing in the actual world. So, for example, one sort of idealization strategy takes an agent’s actual
mental states, adjusts them for consistency and coherency, and holds that the normative facts (e.g. an actual agent’s
reasons) are determined by this non-actual adjustment of the actual agent’s mental states.
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limited by others at all, one might think, is oppressive. So, one might think, suitably idealized social
IPRs would be ones where individual options are not relationally constrained or defined at all: they
would be ones where individual agents are free to do whatever they please regardless of what other
agents do. However, holding that a social IPR must be such that each agent’s choices and options are
totally unaffected by others’ creates two problems: it would not only undergenerate reasons, but also
seems to be false as a diagnosis of what makes oppressive IPRs noxious. As we saw above, all social
IPRs are structured so that an individual’s choices are at least in part determined by other
individuals within the IPR. And, having one’s options and choices relationally constrained in
general is not oppressive: as we saw with the use of the screen in the basketball case, having one’s
options and choices be relationally determined is not always limiting, and can in fact sometimes be
liberating and empowering (e.g. it can make it that one has more ways to achieve one’s goals (to
score) rather than less).
Another option is to say that oppressive IPRs are distinctive in virtue of their structures
being across the board unequal. More specifically, one could say that oppressive IPRs are noxious
because they distribute rights, responsibilities and expectations unequally amongst the
nodes/individual participants: for example, some individuals have the expectation of child-rearing,
while others have the expectation of having a career. In this way, one may think that suitably
idealized social IPRs are structured by making everything equal across the board: every individual or
nodes has the same rights, responsibilities, expectations, power, etc. Yet, this criteria faces the same
problems as the last. For one, merely having generally unequal or different distribution of rights,
responsibilities, and expectations across individuals is not necessarily oppressive. We only need to
consider the basketball case again to see why that’s the case: just because the coach has different
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rights than the players, and has power over the way the players play, this does not mean that the
players are being oppressed by the coach, or that basketball is an oppressive social practice. For that
matter, we do not think that basketball is an oppressive practice simply because Kyrie Irving has
different responsibilities than the coach. Similar remarks apply to the institution of parenting: just
because a parent has more power than a child does not mean that the child is oppressed (by the
parent).
At the same time, I do think that looking to the kind of power that individuals have within
IPRs in virtue of occupying certain nodes is a promising place to look when seeking to idealize
social IPRs so that they generate reasons--it’s just not that all kinds of power that individuals have
in virtue of occupying nodes ought to be distributed equally. Remember here that one of the powers
individuals have in virtue of occupying a node is with respect to the looping effect, or feedback
mechanism in which agents can adjust the norms that govern them within the IPR. It’s important to
note, though, that this mechanism is value neutral: that is, just as it can operate so as to bring about
positive change (like lessening the restrictions on women’s roles in parenting), it can also work in
ways that are deleterious. Given this, the looping effect itself does not ensure that an IPR isn’t
oppressive. In light of this, I propose that we idealize the looping effect itself in the following way:
that every node have equal looping power--that is, that every node have the same ability to
determine the constitution of the IPR itself (the way in which rights, responsibilities, and power are
distributed across nodes). It is not that every node needs to have the same choices or responsibilities,
but that each node need to have the same power to determine the choices and responsibilities that
belong to each node. Call this view Looping Social Constructivism.
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We should now turn to consider versions of two real life institutions idealized for equal
looping power: basketball and democracy. Of course, as institutions which exist in the real world,
they currently stand as non-ideal. However, just as individualistic views that utilize idealization
require some imagination in considering the contours of their idealized individuals, the same will be
required here. What is important is to imagine the shape of the institution once every node has the
same ability to determine the way in which rights, responsibility, and power are distributed across
the nodes. In what follows I will illustrate how equal looping power can manifest in institutions as
different as these.
Let’s start with our favorite institution, basketball. Within the institution of basketball,
there are rules that determine how many points each shot is worth. With the introduction of the
three-point line in the NBA 1979, all shots were not equal: while all (non-penalty) shots inside of
the three-point line counted as two points, all shots outside of the line counted as three. Over time,
the distance of the perimeter three-point line has expanded and contracted. Having once been 22
feet 9 inches across from the basket and 22 feet at the corners, from 1994-1997 the arc was reduced
to 22 feet all around; since the 1997-1998 season the arc returned to its former dimensions, where it
currently stands today.143 One reason why it was reduced was to reduce the number of low scoring
games.144 Similarly, today some fans are calling for it to be moved back even more, one reason being
to increase the diversity of shots attempted and overall excitement of the game.145
In this real life example, there are many roles in play that account for the change of one of
the constitutive rules of NBA basketball, the three-point line/shot. It seemed to be a collective effort
amongst the players, coaches, fans, and officials: the players shooting better and worse from the line
Hand (2014).
Ibid.
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affected where it was placed (the better they got at making perimeter shots the further it was
placed); the coaches calling certain plays over others affected where it was placed (the more
perimeter shots coaches call for the further it is placed); the fans enjoying the three-point line being
in play in the first place and desiring an interesting and exciting game affected where it was placed
(the less they enjoy it the further it is placed); and, finally, the NBA officials acted in light of all of
the agents’ actions in these other roles in determining where to place the line as an official rule.
Idealizing this case appropriately, it wouldn’t just be the NBA officials who decided that the
three-point line would be at one length at one time and another length at another time: rather, they
would be using their final law-making role and power of deciding which rules to sign into the NBA
by responding to the desires and actions of the other nodes (e.g., making it a certain length because
the fans desire a most exciting game). This idealized case illustrates that even though different roles
or nodes of the institution of NBA basketball have different rights and responsibilities, and different
power with respect to different domains (coaches have more power than NBA officials with respect
to determining which plays are made), all of the roles or nodes of the institution have equal power
with respect to the looping role, that is, with respect to the power to constitute and change the
institution as a whole.
As illustrative as this idealized NBA case may be, one might think this is a case where such
idealization isn’t crucial, as it’s an opt-in practice, and so it doesn’t matter much if this practice is
genuinely normative. Turning our attention to a more important case, we can look to the simplified
case of an ideal political democracy. Considering only two of its roles or nodes of legislator and
citizen/voter, it’s obvious that there are many ways in which there are differences in power between
these two roles. In order for this institution of democracy to be genuinely normative according to
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the idealization constraint of Looping Social Constructivism, it does not need to be the case that
these differences in domain-relative power need to be equalized. Indeed, as both of these cases
show, my account allows for social IPRs that have a unique legislative node. However, for such IPRs
where one nodes has unique legislating power (that is, where one node uniquely determines the
constitutive laws of the IPR), in order for such legislating power to be legitimate, the legislative
node needs to be sensitive to the preferences of the other nodes in some way. That is, the only way
for such IPRs to meet my proposed idealization constraint wherein all of the nodes have equal
power when it comes to determining the structure of the IPR, the non-legislating nodes need to
either determine the legislating node (e.g. by determining its members in the case of democracy), or
the legislating node must legislate by being responsive to and legislating in light of the preferences
and actions of the other non-legislating nodes (as in the case of the idealized NBA).
While these cases illustrate the ways in which equal looping power can manifest, questions
remain concerning the details of the procedure of idealization over actual non-ideal IPRs that actual
agents take part in. Again, as the form of idealization proposed takes place at the social or
institutional level, this procedure would leave the individuals who are members of the IPRs
untouched.146 Rather, we are to take the actual social IPR that an agent is a member of, and then we
must consider what the constitution of the IPR would be if it were to be the case that every node
within that IPR had equal looping power--that is, where each node has equal power with respect to
determining the constitution of the IPR (how the rights, responsibilities, obligations, and power
were assigned across nodes).

Of course, this doesn’t bar the Looping Social Constructivist from also utilizing some form of idealization at the
individual-level. See section 3.3.
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Interestingly, it seems that some thoroughgoingly oppressive IPRs, like slavery, simply
cannot survive such an idealization, since having equal looping power would undermine central
components of what it is to be a slave. If such idealization does not dissolve the IPR itself, we are to
imagine the shape of the idealized IPR by imagining what the IPR would be like if every node had
equal status with respect to their ability to bring the IPR into conformance with their preferences.147
This notion of equal status can be defined negatively: having equal looping power is to not have
one’s ability to affect the constitution of the IPR depend upon with node one occupies.
Lastly, the preferences of a node should be conceived of as those preferences individual
agents have as members of the node: for example, what IPR structure one would prefer as a coach.
Usually, these preferences will be largely clear, as given the constitutive role nodes have that
distinguish them from other nodes, some things would better satisfy it, and thus would be
preferred. In the case where the node’s preferences are clear, they can be conceptualized as a
consensus of individual preferences; however, if it is unclear what the node’s preferences are
because, for example, there is disagreement over what as a member of the node one should prefer (e.g.
disagreement over what, as a coach, one should prefer) such that a consensus is lacking, the node’s
preferences can be conceptualized as the aggregate or average of individual preferences.148

Since this conception of equal looping power entails that each node has equal status with respect to constituting the
IPR in conformity with their preferences, the number of individual agents who occupy a single node does not affect the
power a node has: it is not the case that just because many agents belong to one node, that node has greater chances of
successfully conforming the IPR to their preferences. This guards against tyrannic majority issues.
148
Of course, many questions and challenges remain concerning this idealization strategy. Many of these concerns are
concerns for idealization strategies in general: some epistemic (how can we, actual agents, come to know what our
reasons are?), some normative (doesn’t this make one alienated from one’s reasons?). Although it is outside the scope of
the current paper to fully address these issues here, one thing to note is that insofar as these are concerns that afflict
idealization strategies as such, this particular account is no worse: if one wasn’t against idealization strategies to begin
with, the fact that these concerns follow my specific social account shouldn’t dissuade one from adopting it. Secondly, it
initially seems as though my account faces these issues to a lesser extent, as individual agents aren’t themselves changed
(so that there is no other version of themselves to be alienated from), and the epistemic access they have to the
normative facts is more secure (they don’t have to imagine what they would be like if they were different (a very
difficult task indeed), but rather just how they would act and what they would choose if they had the power to do so).
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Having clarified these details, we can now fully specify Looping Social Constructivism in the
following way:
An agent’s reasons are determined by the resulting idealized versions of the IPRs she actually
takes part in after they are idealized for equal looping power such that each node in the IPR
has the same ability to bring the constitution of the IPR (the way in which rights,
responsibilities, expectations, and power are distributed across nodes) into conformance with
their node’s preferences.
3.3. Some Problematic Cases
Although basketball, democracy, and slavery offered straightforward cases that illustrated
the RGC of equal looping power and how its use as a RGC can rule out oppressive IPRs, not all
cases are so simple. Given this, we should also look to some more complicated possible cases of
oppressive IPRs where overgeneration concerns might lurk. Investigating these cases would allow
for further understanding of the extent of the view, as well as insight into the resources it has in
ruling out oppressive IPRs as normative.
One type of potentially problematic cases are those where it seems like each node within an
IPR shouldn’t have equal looping power in the first place. First, consider various caretaking
practices like parenting. Not only does it seem constitutive of such practices that participants don’t
have equal power, but it also seems like it would be harmful for those in the cared-for role (e.g.
children) to have equal looping power those in the caring-for role (e.g. parents). However, it’s
important to remember here that equal looping power does not entail node powers or equal power
within an institution that’s provided by one’s role. This is to say that a practice can have equal
looping power (equal power in determining the distribution of rights, responsibilities, and powers
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across nodes) without it being the case that each node has the same powers or rights to do the same
things (that children also have the right to decide what insurance policy to adopt or to drive).
Consequently, a practice of parenting can have equal looping power while the parents have more
power or rights to do things than children without it being the case that children lack equal looping
power.
Another kind of case where it seems counterintuitive to have equal looping power is the
institution of our prison system. Even if we might think that there should be drastic prison
reform--as our current prison system is certainly oppressive149--it seems like we perhaps still
wouldn’t want to go so far as to say that prisoners should have just as much power in the
determination of the overall structure of the prison system as any other node within the institution.
The thought here is that if we were to allow prisoners equal looping power, the prison system that
would result would be in their favor to an intolerable extent.
Notice, though, that this doesn’t automatically follow from the idealization constraint put
forth: that is, just because every node has equal looping power, and thus equal status with respect to
their ability to bring the IPR into conformance with their preferences, doesn’t mean that the IPR
will actually take on the shape of any one node’s preferences. This is akin to a direct democracy: just
because every citizen has one vote--and thus every citizen has equal power in this sense--does not
entail that the law (or whatever is being voted on) automatically conforms to a specific citizen’s
preferences. So, in this case, even if we were to allow prisoners, as a node, equal looping power in
the constitution of the prison system, this does not mean that the shape the idealized prison system
ultimately takes would conform to the prisoners’ preferences. Many times, it seems as though there
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will have to be some compromise between the preferences of the nodes when they conflict.
Additionally, we should be less worried about this case in particular, as this particular institution is
one where there are many nodes with varied interests, and thus the chances of the idealized
institution conforming to any one node’s preferences are substantially reduced. The prison system,
as an institution, consists of more than just prisoners and wardens: it also includes guards, police
officers which make original arrests, judges would make the sentencing, private owners who profit
from the prisons, government officials, and even medical staff. So, although under this idealization
constraint prisoners will have some chance of having the idealized institution conform to their
preferences, the chance and thus power they have is not to an objectionable extent.150
The case of the prison system brings up another important objection that highlights the
varied ways in which oppression can manifest: in ruling out oppressive IPRs we should not only
look to the relations between the nodes of the IPR, but also to how individual nodes are constituted.
More specifically, the objection is that even if every node within an IPR has equal looping power,
the IPR might still be oppressive in the way in which individual agents are slotted into certain
nodes. For example, even if the prison system were idealized such that every node had equal looping
power, the IPR may still be oppressive if all the individuals that come to inhabit the prisoner node
are, for example, persons of color. One line of response for the Looping Social Constructivist
involves appealing to the interdependence of IPRs. That is, one can point to the fact that individual
agents in the actual world belong to many different IPRs. Plausibly, if all of the IPRs that an
individual belonged in were idealized for equal looping power, then this issue of individuals being
slotted into nodes in seemingly oppressive ways would no longer hold. For example, if the prison
Of course, some may think that prisoners having any power--that is, having their preferences have any impact in the
structure of the prison system--is objectionable. I take this position to be much too implausible, as prisoners are still
persons, deserving of basic rights, and as such their preferences should carry some weight.
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system, judicial system, education system, housing system, etc. were all idealized for equal looping
power, it seems unlikely that all of the individuals that come to inhabit the prisoner node would be
persons of color.151
Another complicated case arises from the fact that oppression can manifest in social
structures by affecting not only whether all individuals have equal looping power but whether they
even exercise it at all. Most generally, this is the problem of internalized oppression. For example,
consider a possible religious practice where although women have equal looping power in the sense
that they could change the IPR, women (seem to) voluntarily give up this power, and instead yield to
their male partner’s every preference, including their sexist or misogynistic ones.152 Moreover, these
women may prefer to use their power in a way that would match or defer to another node’s
preferences.153 For example, women immersed in sexist IPRs may, even under this idealization at
the social level, simply defer to men, matching their preferences to the preferences of the men. This
is the problem of adaptive preferences: under conditions of oppression, agents come to adapt their
preferences to fit their oppressive conditions, typically preferring what their subordinate position
prescribes that they prefer. For example, if women’s subordinate role prescribes that women stay
out of public life (including the workforce) and raise children, women come to prefer to not work
and instead raise children. As this kind of case illustrates, even if certain nodes (women) were given
equal power of constituting the IPR according to their preferences, and actually used this power, the

Of course, the ways in which IPRs interact with and affect one another is an extremely rich topic unto itself, and I
cannot do it justice here. Rather, I hoped to have pointed to a plausible avenue of response for the Looping Social
Constructivist with respect to this specific issue. I’m grateful to Milo Phillips-Brown for both bringing this important
issue to my attention and suggesting this line of response.
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This case is very similar to that of the “happy slave” that may be more familiar to some readers.
153
Similarly, the oppressed may lack certain non-oppressive imaginative possibilities (that is, they’d lack the ability to
imagine certain non-oppressive configurations of the IPR and their node). I’d like to thank Emma Marija Atherton for
bringing this point to my attention.
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node could end up conforming their preferences to the preferences of other nodes, and thus
nevertheless result in an oppressive IPR.
There are a number of things the Idealized Social Constructivist can say in response to this
issue. First, they could say that the problem with these cases of internalized oppression is not a
structural problem of the kind focused on here, but, rather, the problem concerns bad individual
starting points. In other words, what makes these cases problematic doesn’t have anything to do
with the IPR itself or the way it is structured, but rather with the fact that some individuals which
occupy the IPR have internalized oppressive values. Nevertheless, more can be said to assuage
worries about these cases. Here, one can appeal once again to the web of IPRs that individuals
inhabit. Plausibly, if all of these IPRs were to be properly idealized, this bad starting point of
internalized oppression would also be revised, as it itself is due to noxious social circumstances and
influences. Secondly, one could simply bite the bullet, and admit that in these cases, the idealization
constraint is met, and the IPR is normative. But, one could go on to say that there’s good reason to
believe that these cases where adaptive preferences would persist even after having equal looping
power would be quite rare: for the attitudes and beliefs of the individual agents are likely to change
in light of having such equal power. For example, once women were given the opportunity to join
the workforce, their preferences and values changed as they no longer believed that their “place”
was in the home.
However, one might be unpersuaded that these cases of persistent adaptive preferences lie
outside of the concern of the Looping Social Constructivist, or are quite rare; or, one might think
that, as rare as they may be, they are highly unacceptable. This brings us to the last strategy available
to the Looping Social Constructivist. Although the main strategy and hallmark of Looping Social
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Constructivism is idealization at the social level, there is nothing in principle barring the view from
also utilizing idealizing at the individual level. So, in addition to idealizing for equal looping power,
the view could also idealize for false beliefs of individuals within the nodes, especially those that
concern the IPR itself, like the belief that she has such equal looping power and that she’s not
vulnerable to penalties for using it.
Lastly, one type of problematic case falls out of a fundamental criticism of ideal theory by
non-ideal theorists. The criticism is that if the norms or principles ideal theorists put forth were to
actually be instituted and followed in the actual world, the world would fall further from the ideal
rather than come to more closely conform to it; as a result, this makes the norms proposed by the
ideal theorist illegitimate. To take a simple example: if under ideal conditions it seems that the fair
or just distribution of goods would be to distribute them equally, implementing this distribution in
the actual world given its injustices in distribution of wealth would only serve to exacerbate these
injustices, instead of bringing about conformity to an actual equal distribution of goods. Since
Idealized Social Constructivism is a view that uses idealization, one may think that similar problems
would arise regarding IPRs that take oppressive forms in the actual world. For example, one might
think that if agents actually acted on the norms and reasons that hold for agents in the idealized
form of the IPR they take part in, this would only make the IPR more oppressive. Similarly, one
might think that certain practices that are essential for undoing the injustices of our actual,
non-ideal world, like affirmative action or unions, would be ruled out at the outset as the
constitution of IPRs are determined under idealized conditions; the thought here is that if every
node had equal looping power none would prefer practices like affirmative action or unions, since
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the rationale for these practices depends on the fact that the actual world and IPRs in it are
imperfect.
Let’s take the second non-ideal theory criticism first. Here, even though Idealized Social
Constructivism uses idealization at the social level, one can expect the imperfect status of the actual
world to naturally enter into nodes’ preferences. This is because the process of idealizing at the
social level does not wipe the memory of knowledge that agents have about the injustices and
imperfections of the actual world. In this way, nodes’ preferences would be a matter of what shape
they would want the IPR to take for the actual, non-ideal world, instead of what constitution they
would want the IPR to have if no injustices existed and the world were ideal. So these practices
would not be ruled out at the outset, and would plausibly even be determined as the form of the
practice that results when every node has equal looping power.154
With respect to the first non-ideal criticism, it’s important to note that my account is not an
account of what agents should do, all things considered, or what they have most reason to do;
rather, it is only an account of what reasons agents have, including those that may be overridden.
Even so, one may still think that as an ideal theory, it’s worrisome that my account may entail that
agents have any reason to do actions that, if performed, would either further exacerbate their
oppression or make them worse off. For example, consider the institution of public transit during
segregation. Idealizing this IPR would, intuitively, make it such that riders who were persons of
color had reasons to sit wherever they wanted, including at the front of the bus. But, some might

I say “plausibly” here as I believe it is plausible to assume that a sufficient amount of the individuals who occupy the
nodes within the practice both have knowledge of such injustices and prefer that they not persist. Of course, it is
possible that one of these features does not hold. In this case, if one is significantly bothered by the possibility that, for
example, affirmative action would not be the shape of admissions practices determined after idealizing for equal looping
power, one can always utilize a form of idealization at the individual level previously discussed, where one could thereby
ensure that individuals at least have knowledge of the imperfections of the actual world.
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think it sounds counterintuitive to say that these riders, in the actual world at the time of
segregation, had any reason to defy the current laws and sit at the front of the bus, for this would
make them vulnerable to penalties. However, I think that it’s right to say these riders have some
reason to defy these laws, for this is merely to say that under conditions of oppression, oppressed
agents have some reason to rebel and resist their oppression. Provided that any account of reasons
should be able to account for the fact that the oppressed have some reason to not simply succumb to
their oppression, I welcome this consequence of my view.155
Idealizing IPRs in the way I’ve advanced makes sense of what’s noxious about oppressive
IPRs without ruling out any particular IPRs in virtue of their content. In this way, it’s a
non-question begging and content-neutral way for a non-objectivist social-based view to ensure
that no oppressive IPRs are genuinely normative. First, it seems that an IPR is oppressive when
certain individuals or nodes have greater power of constitution via the looping role than other
individuals or nodes. Looking at the classic case of slavery, we can see that certain individuals (white
slave owners) had greater powers with respect to fixing the rights afforded to the nodes in the
practice (slave owners and slaves) through their behavior (voting so as to pass certain laws, using
weapons, refusing to help slaves or acknowledge them as human beings, etc.). Secondly, having
equal powers of constitution relative to the looping role as a RGC isn’t packing in any value-laden
content: it isn’t saying that individuals ought to have these particular kinds of responsibilities and
rights or those particular choices and options. It also remains sufficiently non-objectivist: my account
still holds that an agent’s reasons are a function of the values and (constitutive) norms of the social
IPRs that she takes part in. It does not say that some relevant evaluative notion of ‘equality’ is
Importantly, this is not to say that the oppressed have obligations to resist their oppression, or all things considered
ought to rebel. On the obligation of the oppressed to resist their oppression, see Boxill (2010), Buss (2010), Card (2006)
and Hay (2011).
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objectively valuable and the condition under which IPRs are genuinely normative--rather, just as
individualistic social-based views idealizes certain individual cognitive (evidence, drunkenness) and
affective (weakness of will, depression) powers or capacities agents have, my Looping Social
Constructivism idealizes certain social powers and capacities agents have, as the power of
constitution of an IPR with respect to the looping role is a power one has as a social agent.156, 157
For these reasons, my Looping Social Constructivism is able to meet one of the biggest challenges
to social-based views of ruling out oppressive IPRs as genuinely normative while remaining
content-neutral and non-objectivist.

4. Concluding Remarks
While Looping Social Constructivism may not ensure that no agent ever has any reasons to
act in ways that seemingly conform to oppressive practices (e.g. that no agent ever has a reason to
be a housewife), I’ve argued that it does ensure that these reasons don’t have their source in, or
aren’t in virtue of, the valid IPR itself. Now, I want to take a step back from this specific challenge
that is the focus of this paper and look to some upshots of this work, particularly how the picture of
Looping Social Constructivism presented here fits with some issues that are important and
underappreciated.

To be clear, on my view it is that the IPR itself is idealized at the social level (at the level of the nodes), and that as a
result this affects individuals’ (which occupy the nodes) social powers; through idealization, individuals cease being
powerless and come to have this social power, but it is only in virtue of occupying the node that their social power
changes through idealization.
157
One question related to the mind-dependency of my view is whether agents’s reasons could be a function of IPRs that
don’t have equal looping power, provided that these agents opt into or choose to have IPRs where some nodes are
deprived of this equal power. In the same way as individualistic non-objectivist theorists like Subjectivism wouldn’t say
that an agent’s reasons could be a function of their state of drunkenness even if that the agent choose to be in this state, I
would like to rule out the idea that an agent’s reasons could be a function of IPRs that don’t have equal looping power
amongst the nodes provided that an agent chooses to be in such an IPR.
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One important issue this work speaks to is the role and importance of feminist
considerations when constructing philosophical theories, especially normative ones. Aims, values,
issues, and strategies held by feminist philosophers are often underappreciated; here, they are
widely and seriously incorporated. This incorporation is noteworthy since, unlike other areas in
contemporary analytic philosophy, there’s been an unfortunate dearth of explicit feminist
approaches to metaethics.158
More particularly, the social-based view I put forth here fares very well across several
feminist constraints, and so looks to be a good candidate as a kind of feminist metaethics. First, the
account is not overly “masculinist” by putting forth a view of agency where agents are completely
independent, isolated, calculating, and free of any social ties.159 Rather, the view of agency
developed in this view looks at agents through their social context, taking the social seriously by
having the relations that agents bear to others take primary focus. Additionally, the view takes most
seriously a great feminist concern: oppression. By holding that theories ought, minimally, not entail
that agents have reasons to participate in, perpetuate, and maintain oppressive practices and norms
that are sourced in the oppressive practice itself, the constraint on theories of normative reasons
that no oppressive IPRs be ruled as genuinely normative honors feminist concerns; by meeting this
constraint, my view is deemed successful by feminist lights.
Lastly, through the kind of idealizing constraint put forth, this view also makes possible the
evaluation and critique of “social structures, social roles, role-obligations, access to power, and the
formation of selves to fit the structures” that feminists are urging our ethics and metaethics make

Some exceptions being Driver (2012) and Superson (2012).
This is a classic feminist criticism that has been put forth against theories of autonomy, ethical theories, and theories
of justice.
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159

120

possible.160 By gaining a picture of what idealized social IPRs look like, we gain a better picture of
what is wrong with our current social IPRs, and a direction of where to go and what to change to
make the kinds of improvements to our social world that feminists demand.161

5. Summary
There are many considerations that speak in favor of locating reasons on the social level.
However, those that do are faced with a pressing task: ensure that some, but not all, social
institutions, practices, and relations (IPRs) are genuinely normative and generate reasons. More
particularly, I’ve argued that what’s most important is that social-based views ensure that no
oppressive IPRs are genuinely normative and generate reasons. In this paper, I have argued that two
contemporary social-based views fail to do so, and proposed a new social-based view--Looping
Social Constructivism--which is both able to rule out oppressive IPRs as normative and remain
non-objectivist and content-neutral. In doing so, I put forth a novel use of idealization that occurs
at the social or institutional level, rather than the level of individual agents. On my view, the
reasons an agent has are a function of the social IPRs they are actually a part of when they are
idealized such that every node within the IPR has equal power in constituting the IPR itself.

See Haslanger (2012b).
Although one may be concerned with general issues non-ideal theorists point out with ideal theories, this is one way
in which I think my theory, although it endorses an idealizing strategy, does not face similar problems: namely that
configuring the ideal is often the first step to understanding what direction to head in when setting out to change our
current non-ideal circumstances. Moreover, I take my theory to side-step other traditional non-ideal theory objections,
like those lodged against Rawls. For example, the problem many non-ideal and feminist theorists take with Rawls’
original position is that it abstracts away from and in this way completely erases the social positions and relations an
agent has. However, my theory does not idealize by abstracting away from agents’ social features. See also section 3.3.
for my resolution of other traditional objections from non-ideal theory.
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Critical Thinking, Syracuse University, Summer 2016
Introduction to Moral Theory, Syracuse University, Fall 2015
Ethics and Contemporary Issues, Syracuse University, Summer 2015
Philosophy of Feminism, Syracuse University, Spring 2015
Social and Political Philosophy, Syracuse University, Fall 2014
Introduction to Philosophy, Brandeis University, Summer 2014
As Guest Lecturer
“The Oddity of Moral Testimony,” PIKSI-Boston, Summer 2015
“Moral Motivation,” Metaethics (Brett Sherman), Brandeis University, Spring 2012
“Stephen Darwall and Angela Smith on Blame”, Causation and Blame (Marion Smiley),
Brandeis University, Fall 2011
As Teaching Assistant
Ethics and the Media, Syracuse University (Paul Prescott), Fall 2016
Stem Cells and Society, Syracuse University (Hille Paakkunainen), Spring 2014
Social and Political Philosophy, Syracuse University (David Sobel), Fall 2013
Introduction to Philosophy, Syracuse University (Mark Heller), Spring 2013
Introduction to Ethics, Syracuse University (Samuel Gorovitz), Fall 2012
Existentialism, Brandeis University (Berislav Marusic) Spring 2012
Ethics and the Emotions, Brandeis University (Kate Moran), Fall 2011
Introduction to Ethics, Brandeis University (Kate Moran), Spring 2011
Bioethics, Brandeis University (Eli Hirsch), Fall 2010
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SERVICE
Professional
Executive Committee Member, PIKSI-Boston, 2015-2016
Mentor, PIKSI-Boston, 2014-2015
Chair, American Philosophical Association Central Division Meeting, February 2015
Chair, Princeton University Networking and Mentoring Workshop for Graduate Student
Women in Philosophy, August 2014
Departmental
Lecturer, Syracuse University’s Philosophy for Children Program with Southside Academy
Charter School, 2015-2016, 2014-2015
Co-organizer, Syracuse University Women’s Working Papers, 2015-2016, 2014-2015
Reviewer, Syracuse University Graduate Conference, 2014-2015, 2012-2013
Co-organizer, Syracuse University Graduate Conference, 2013-2014
Co-organizer, Syracuse University Women’s Group, 2013-2014
Co-founder and co-organizer, Syracuse University Metaethics Reading Group,
2013-present
Founder and Organizer, Undergraduate Women in Philosophy Meet and Greet, 2013-2014
External Speaker Committee, Syracuse University Graduate Conference, 2012-2013
Co-organizer, Brandeis University Brown Bag Series, 2010-2011
GRADUATE COURSEWORK (audited courses marked with *)
Value Theory
*Topics in Ethics and Value Theory (Kate Manne), Spring 2015
Practical Reason (David Sobel), Spring 2014
*How to Be Good (Julia Markovits), Fall 2014
Autonomy (Hille Paakkunainen and Kenneth Baynes), Fall 2013
Varieties of Naturalism in Metaethics (Hille Paakkunainen), Spring 2013
Ethics and Political Philosophy Proseminar (Hille Paakkunainen), Fall 2012
Metaethics (Brett Sherman), Spring 2012
Causation and Blame (Marion Smiley), Fall 2011
Ethics and the Emotions (Kate Moran), Fall 2011
Kant’s Moral Philosophy (Kate Moran), Spring 2011
Sources of Normativity (Marion Smiley), Fall 2010
Social/Political Philosophy
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Philosophy of Feminism (Kara Richardson), Fall 2013
Philosophy of Social Science (Kenneth Baynes), Fall 2012
Metaphysics and Epistemology
*Epistemic Value and Normativity (Nathaniel Sharadin), Fall 2016
Language, Epistemology, Mind and Metaphysics Proseminar (Andre Gallois and Michael Caie),
Spring 2013
Testimony and Disagreement (Brett Sherman), Spring 2012
The Truth about Fiction (Palle Yourgrau), Spring 2011
Personal Identity (Robert Greenberg), Spring 2011
Graduate Proseminar (Eli Hirsch), Fall 2010
Logic and Language
Deontic Modals (J.L. Dowell), Spring 2014
Logic and Language Proseminar (Michael Caie), Fall 2012
Language and Context (Brett Sherman), Spring 2012
Intermediate Logic (Alan Berger), Fall 2010
Continental Philosophy
Heidegger’s Being and Time (Simon Critchley), Spring 2009
History
History Proseminar (Frederick C. Beiser), Fall 2013
REFERENCES
David Sobel, Irwin and Marjorie Guttag Professor, Ethics and Political Philosophy (Ph.D. co-chair),
Syracuse University, dsobel@syr.edu
Hille Paakkunainen, Assistant Professor (Ph.D. co-chair), Syracuse University, hpaakkun@syr.edu
Janice Dowell, Associate Professor (Ph.D. committee member), Syracuse University,
jldowell@syr.edu
Sally Haslanger, Ford Professor of Philosophy and Women’s Studies, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, shaslang@mit.edu
Danielle Bromwich, Associate Professor (teaching reference), University of Massachusetts Boston,
danielle.bromwich@umb.edu
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